NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 97 | Number 2

Article 2

1-1-2019

The Role of States in Liberalizing Land Use
Regulations
Anika Singh Lemar

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Anika S. Lemar, The Role of States in Liberalizing Land Use Regulations, 97 N.C. L. Rev. 293 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol97/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

97 N.C. L. REV. 293 (2019)

THE ROLE OF STATES IN LIBERALIZING
LAND USE REGULATIONS*
ANIKA SINGH LEMAR**
Across the political spectrum, economists agree that local land
use regulations exacerbate inequality, decrease opportunity, and
hinder economic growth by inflating housing prices. Local
governments are structurally ill-equipped to solve this problem,
which must instead be solved at the state level. Advocates of local
control, however, decry nascent state intervention efforts as
unprecedented overreach by state officials.
These efforts are not unprecedented, but they are misunderstood.
Contrary to assumptions embedded in both the political debate
and the land use scholarship, state-level liberalization of zoning
has benefited users such as family day cares and mobile
homeowners for at least forty years. These interventions remove
local authority to ban certain land uses, while expressly
permitting local governments to address a limited set of potential
impacts of those land uses. This kind of tailoring requirement,
which both addresses local governments’ propensity to
overregulate land use and recognizes local competency to
address discrete aspects of development, ought to serve as a
model for contemporary state intervention efforts. These
intervention efforts, in turn, are a key component of any effort to
address growing barriers to economic opportunity.
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INTRODUCTION
For the first time in decades, there are widespread calls for states
to intervene in local land use regulation. Previous generations of
interventionists sought to address environmental concerns and
advance desegregation.1 Today’s interventionists, from California to
Massachusetts, seek to advance economic opportunity, decrease
inequality, and further national economic growth by undoing

1. Nearly fifty years ago, the President’s Commission on Environmental Quality
commissioned a book assessing instances in which states or regional governments assumed
regulatory oversight over land use. The book’s authors argued that federal and state
governments increasingly exercised authority over land use in an effort to address
externalities imposed by local governments. They termed this trend a “quiet revolution.”
Fifty years later, however, local governments retain primary control over land use
planning. FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION 3 (1972); see
also Celeste M. Hammond, Foreword: 40th Anniversary of the Quiet Revolution in Zoning
and Land Use Regulation, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV., at iii, iii (2012).
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restrictive local zoning.2 Local governments, as others have
persuasively argued, ignore the interests of first-time home buyers,
renters, real estate developers and investors, employers, and others in
favor of preserving incumbent homeowners’ property values.3 As a
result, across the political spectrum, economists and others agree that
local land use regulations decrease mobility and hinder economic
growth by inflating housing prices.4
Even when federal and state governments intervene, they are
deeply hesitant to restrict local authority to act. In response to localist
instincts, state and federal interventions often supplement, rather
than displace, local regulatory authority.5 As a result, property owners
are forced to expend significant time and money navigating multitiered regulatory regimes. Development proposals face the possibility
of veto at any one of two or three levels of review.6 These
interventions add to, rather than take away from, a property owner’s
regulatory burden and are not models for state interventions seeking
to encourage development or decrease housing prices. Because state
and federal interventions fail to address the problem of local
overreach, they do not decrease housing prices.
In a few notable (and oft-overlooked) cases, however, a
substantial number of states have intervened to limit or prohibit local
regulation, thus decreasing development costs.7 Examining legislative
history sources in over forty states, this Article seeks to learn from

2. See, e.g., Kriston Capps, Oregon May Strip Portland of Its NIMBY Powers,
CITYLAB (June 19, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/design/2017/06/oregons-hb-2007-wouldpreempt-cities-zoning-rights/528612/ [https://perma.cc/5HGC-XMZP]; Lorraine Woellert,
Why Washington Can’t Fix the New Housing Crisis, POLITICO (July 7, 2017, 5:24 AM),
http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/07/07/housing-crisis-shortage-no-fix-000472
[https://perma.cc/D6T5-VAPU].
3. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 72–97 (2001) [hereinafter
FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS]; Vicki Been, Josiah Madar & Simon McDonnell,
Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth Machine?, 11 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227, 231–33 (2014).
4. See discussion infra Section I.A.
5. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES! THE ECONOMICS OF LAND USE
REGULATION 54–57 (2015) [hereinafter, FISCHEL, ZONING RULES!]; Richard Briffault,
Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 67
(1990).
6. Interestingly, some states choose to adopt statewide building codes while others
permit local governments to adopt building codes. Building codes are not the subject of
this Article, but perhaps future scholarship can provide some insight into the causes and
impacts of statewide versus local building codes.
7. These are family day care homes, manufactured housing, alternative energy
infrastructure, and group homes. See infra Part II.
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those instances in which localist instincts give way to deregulatory
state intervention in a large number of states: small and large, urban
and rural, and red and blue.
This Article seeks to learn from state interventions that
meaningfully shift control away from local governments. In Part I, I
differentiate between those interventions that substantively limit local
land use regulatory authority, “displacing interventions,”8 and those
that do not.9 The remainder of the Article will focus on those
displacing interventions that can be found in a significant number of
states across the country.
In Part II, I examine four land uses—family day cares, group
homes, manufactured housing, and small-scale alternative energy
infrastructure—that benefit from displacing interventions in a
significant number of states. In Part III, I argue that a state’s decision
to intervene is a function of three key factors. First, states provide a
lobbying opportunity for well-organized interests that cannot
compete at the local level due to the entrenched power of
homeowners. Second, states act when local regulations frustrate the
workings of the state bureaucracy, even when the state does not own
the property affected by local regulation. Third, states craft standards
that balance state interests in liberalized land use regulations and
local interests in mitigating discrete undesirable impacts of certain
kinds of development. These are effectively tailoring requirements,
which allocate land use authority between states and local
government according to which level of government is most
competent to exercise that authority. This Article ends by arguing in
favor of tailoring requirements, which are underutilized in land use
law. Tailoring requirements strip local governments of the ability to
enact outright prohibitions on disfavored uses, while permitting them
to regulate discrete perceived harms associated with those uses. State
interventions that embrace these tailoring requirements are key to
increasing mobility and addressing regional economic inequality.

8. This term is defined, infra Section I.B.
9. Richard Briffault describes the concept of “state action displacing local
authority.” Briffault, supra note 5, at 12 n.35. He introduces the concept in order to then
describe very limited efforts by state legislatures and courts to “displac[e] the structure of
decentralized responsibility for education finance and unfettered local control over land
use.” Id. at 19. Oftentimes, this end result is accomplished by state legislatures “devolving
broad authority to localities and then declining to pass laws displacing the operations of
policies of their local governments.” Id. at 18.
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I. A TAXONOMY OF STATE INTERVENTION
Local regulation of land use is the default rule in the United
States. While zoning is an exercise of the police power, normally the
domain of state governments, every state has delegated that authority
to local government via a zoning enabling act. Most of these are
modeled on the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act promulgated by
the United States Department of Commerce in 1926.10
Contrary to the prevailing view, states, from time to time,
intervene in local land use planning to decrease rather than increase
regulatory burdens. These statutes have not garnered the scholarly
attention paid to interventions like New Jersey’s Mount Laurel cases
or Oregon’s regional growth management.11 Nevertheless, these
interventions constitute a significant phenomenon in land use law,
and they deserve a more thorough scholarly treatment. Indeed, they
have much to tell us about how and when states choose to intervene
in local land use decision-making.
A. Why Deregulation?
A September 2016 White House white paper makes plain the
appeal of and need for deregulatory intervention.12 The paper argues
that “[o]ver the past three decades, local barriers to housing
development have intensified” and that “[t]he accumulation of such
barriers—including zoning, other land use regulations, and lengthy
development approval processes—has reduced the ability of many
housing markets to respond to growing demand.”13 Synthesizing
recent economics scholarship, the white paper identifies three
national problems arising out of overly restrictive zoning: “[t]he
growing severity of undersupplied housing markets is jeopardizing
housing affordability for working families, increasing income
inequality by reducing less-skilled workers’ access to high-wage labor
markets, and stifling GDP growth by driving labor migration away
from the most productive regions.”14 These concerns are shared
10. John R. Nolon, Zoning’s Centennial: A Complete Account of the Evolution of
Zoning into a Robust System of Land Use Law—1916–2016 (Part I), ZONING & PLAN. L.
REP., Oct. 2016, at 1, 3.
11. See infra Section I.B.3.
12. THE WHITE HOUSE, HOUSING DEVELOPMENT TOOLKIT 2–3 (2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Housing_Development_
Toolkit%20f.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UMS-TFVQ].
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id.
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across the political spectrum. While the white paper was issued by
Barack Obama’s White House, the economist driving Donald
Trump’s housing policy has embraced it.15
The problem, as identified by the white paper and the various
economists, social scientists, and legal scholars upon whose work the
white paper relies, is overregulation of land use.16 It is therefore not
surprising that five of the ten policy measures that the white paper
advocates are deregulatory in nature.17 These measures would, if
implemented across towns and states, increase the number of housing
units one could build on a given parcel, in a given town, and
nationally. They would also decrease the time and expense of
regulatory review processes. Developers could spread the cost of land
over many units, enjoy the efficiencies of multifamily development,
and increase supply to the extent that the market (rather than a
zoning commissioner) will bear. These measures, if enacted in a
sufficient number of places, could begin to rectify the three national
problems identified in the white paper.
The white paper stakes no role for the federal or state
governments in deregulatory land use policy. There have already,
however, been instances when states have entered the fray. The day
after the White House released its white paper, California Governor
Jerry Brown embraced one of the white paper’s suggested policy
measures by signing into law an attempt to force local governments to
loosen restrictions on accessory dwellings.18 One year later he signed
into law a requirement that towns approve affordable housing
developments, subject to certain state-imposed conditions.19 In early
15. See Woellert, supra note 2 (“[Mark] Calabria, chief economist to Vice President
Mike Pence and an administration point person on housing . . . is an advocate of zoning
deregulation—he called land use a ‘crucial economic issue’ for the whole country . . . . Last
fall, he tipped his hat to Obama after the president tried to jawbone cities and counties
into easing up on zoning restrictions.”).
16. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 12, at 2.
17. The five policy measures are (1) establish by-right development, (2) streamline or
shorten permitting processes and timelines, (3) eliminate off-street parking requirements,
(4) enact high-density and multifamily zoning, and (5) allow accessory dwelling units. Id.
at 3.
18. Act of Sept. 27, 2016, ch. 720, sec. 2, § 65583.1, 2016 Cal. Stat. 4945, 4946 (codified
at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65583.1 (West Supp. 2018)). Accessory dwellings are “small,
secondary dwelling units commonly located behind the primary home or above a garage,
but may also be in a converted basement or attic.” Edward J. Sullivan, Meeting the
Disruption of the Hot Housing Market: Some Thoughts from North America, ZONING &
PLAN. L. REP., July 2018, at 3.
19. Act of Sept. 29, 2017, ch. 366, sec. 1, § 65400, 2017 Cal. Stat. 2935, 2936 (codified at
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65400 (West Supp. 2018)).
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2018, that bill’s sponsor introduced legislation that would require
California towns to permit high-density multifamily housing
proximate to transit stops.20 The bill had its detractors, to put it
mildly. As one newspaper reported, “Berkeley Mayor Jesse Arreguín
characterizes the bill as ‘a declaration of war against our
neighborhoods.’”21
State efforts to ease local zoning (and the backlash they
engender) are not limited to California. In June 2016, the
Massachusetts Senate passed a bill loosening some restrictions on
accessory dwellings and requiring each municipality to identify at
least one zone permitting multifamily zoning of some minimum
density.22 Oregon legislators are considering a proposal to accelerate
local administrative review of affordable housing developments.23 In
these states, famously restrictive zoning and resultant high housing
prices discourage economic development by increasing the cost to
hire employees in the state.24 To date, these are halfhearted (and only
partially successful) efforts, but, as this Article argues below, a better
understanding of the history of successful displacing interventions
should inform efforts to strip local governments of the ability to
overregulate land use.
B.

Understanding State Interventions

Scholars concerned with exclusionary aspects of local zoning
have repeatedly argued for some form of state intervention (or, more
accurately, return of power and authority granted by the states in the
first instance). In order to assess these interventions, it is important to

20. S. 827, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); see also Scott Wiener,
California Needs a Housing-First Agenda: My 2018 Housing Package, MEDIUM: ART +
MARKETING (Jan. 4, 2018), https://artplusmarketing.com/california-needs-a-housing-firstagenda-my-2018-housing-package-1b6fe95e41da [https://perma.cc/D7MA-SBXA].
21. Janis Mara, Berkeley Mayor on Wiener-Skinner Housing Bill: ‘A Declaration of
War
Against
our
Neighborhoods,’
BERKELEYSIDE
(Jan.
22,
2018),
http://www.berkeleyside.com/2018/01/22/berkeley-mayor-wiener-skinner-housing-billdeclaration-war-neighborhoods/ [https://perma.cc/35HM-8V5U].
22. S. 2311, 189th Gen. Court, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2016).
23. H.R. 2007, 79th Legis. Assemb., 2017 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017).
24. While economists have attempted to calculate the costs imposed on the national
economy by restrictive zoning, no one has attempted to calculate the costs to individual
states. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Why Do Cities Matter? Local Growth and
Aggregate Growth 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21154, 2015).
While there is no full accounting of the costs borne by states with restrictive zoning, there
is strong evidence that those states’ zoning policies slow their economic growth. See, e.g.,
id.
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differentiate among them. There are four categories of intervention:
procedural, double veto, clawback, and deregulatory. While each
category will be explained in turn, this Article is concerned only with
the latter two categories, those substantive interventions that
displace, rather than supplement, local authority. I refer to clawback
and deregulatory interventions collectively as “displacing
interventions.”
1. Procedural Interventions
Procedural interventions are the most commonly used of the four
types. These interventions impose conditions on the exercise of local
zoning authority. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act largely
consists of mandatory procedures.25 It requires, for example,
establishment of local boards and commissions, public hearings, and
appeals procedures.26 Many scholars have focused on one procedural
intervention in particular: the requirement that zoning ordinances
comport with a local or regional plan.27 Planning requirements are
common, though some state courts have interpreted their state’s
zoning enabling act to permit localities to treat the zoning ordinance
itself as the plan.28 As a result, the planning requirement is a nullity.
The ordinance need only be consistent with itself in order to meet the
planning requirement.
One example of a procedural intervention is New York’s State
Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”).29 SEQRA imposes
25. See ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING
ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITY MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS 6–7 (rev. ed.
1926). It is admittedly a bit odd to speak of the zoning enabling acts as interventions when
they are the basis of local land use authority. Many of the components of contemporary
zoning enabling acts are additions and interventions made after the first wave of zoning
enabling acts passed in the 1920s. And, for the purposes of this Article, it is useful to
compare the kinds of limitations imposed by the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act and
contemporary zoning enabling acts with the limitations imposed by displacing
interventions. For these reasons, I catalogue enabling acts here in my taxonomy of state
interventions.
26. See id.
27. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS
74–75 (4th ed. 2013) (collecting sources).
28. Id. at 361–63. A minority of states, fewer than fifteen, require a separate planning
document that is consistent with the zoning code. Stuart Meck, The Legislative
Requirement that Zoning and Land Use Controls Be Consistent with an Independently
Adopted Local Comprehensive Plan: A Model Statute, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 295, 305
& n.25 (2000).
29. Act of Aug. 1, 1975, ch. 612, 1975 N.Y. Laws 895, 895–902 (codified as amended at
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 2018)).
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on state and local governments requirements comparable to those
imposed on the federal government by the National Environmental
Policy Act (“NEPA”).30 Because “the scope of SEQRA is nearly
coextensive with the authority of local government in the land use
field,” almost every land use decision must comport with SEQRA’s
requirements.31 But SEQRA does not strip local governments of the
authority to act. It only conditions their actions on meeting certain
procedural requirements.
2. Double Veto Interventions
“Double veto” interventions are likely the second-most common
form of intervention.32 These interventions place their thumb on the
scale against development. Double veto interventions do not strip
local governments of their veto authority over development; they
simply add a second or third veto to the approval process, exercised
by a regional authority, the state government, or the federal
government.33 Richard Briffault describes these as “developments of
regional impact.”34 Because they impose impacts on the state and not
just the locality, they are subject to two or more sets of approvals in
order to proceed.
Double veto interventions impose additional requirements on
the private real estate development market but do not preempt local
authority. One example of interventions that impose an additional
layer of review is federal wetlands regulations. Similarly, “smart
growth” reforms in Florida subject development proposals to a
regional approval and the possibility of rejection at the regional level
only after local approvals have been granted.35

30. Compare id., with National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190,
§ 101, 83 Stat. 852, 852–53 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2012)) (illustrating how national
environmental policies differ from state and local government environmental policies).
31. John R. Nolon, The Erosion of Home Rule Through the Emergence of StateInterests in Land Use Control, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 497, 545–46 (1993).
32. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES!, supra note 5, at 48 (arguing that the overwhelming
effect of “higher government intervention,” which includes both state and federal
interventions, has “been to make zoning more exclusive”).
33. Id. at xi (“In the few instances where they have displaced local authority, state and
federal regulations have tilted zoning mostly toward more restrictiveness. They have
seldom made local governments accept developments that local residents do not want.”).
Fischel, as is clear from the quoted text, uses the verb “displaced” loosely. These
interventions do not in fact displace but, instead, supplement local authority.
34. Briffault, supra note 5, at 65.
35. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES!, supra note 5, at 55.

97 N.C. L. REV. 293 (2019)

302

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

3. Clawback Interventions
The third category, clawback intervention, is preemptive state
regulation of land use. Through clawback interventions, states take
back land use regulatory authority, typically on the grounds that local
decision-making undermines a state interest. States do not, for
example, allow local governments to exercise zoning authority over
state-owned land.36 In addition, most states allocate permitting and
siting authority for utility infrastructure to state administrative
agencies rather than to local governments.37 A large region benefits
from the energy produced by a power plant. Only the town in which it
is located, however, must suffer the most immediate traffic and
aesthetic costs of that plant. Acknowledging that localities do not
have incentives to accommodate these projects and that the state’s
economy would suffer without them, states retain the authority to site
these uses.
Other forms of clawback intervention are much touted but quite
rare in practice. Regional governance is one form in which states take
back land use regulatory authority and reallocate it to a regional
entity.38 New Jersey and New York intervene in land use decisionmaking in environmentally sensitive areas, such as New Jersey’s
Highlands and New York’s Pine Barrens and Adirondack Park.39
A number of states use clawback interventions to facilitate the
development of affordable housing. These provisions, many of which

36. A few states expand this concept to include projects sponsored by the state even if
the projects will not ultimately be owned or operated by the state. New York State’s
Urban Development Corporation has the authority to site industrial projects without
regard to local zoning but must defer to local zoning for residential projects. Briffault,
supra note 5, at 68–69; Nolon, supra note 10, at 533–34.
37. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-50g to 16-50ll (Westlaw through 2018
Feb. Reg. Sess.); Briffault, supra note 5, at 12 n.35 (“State action displacing local authority
often involves the siting of public utilities that serve large regions. A locality may adopt
zoning requirements that would exclude the utility, but the cost of the reduced powergeneration capacity would be felt regionally or state-wide. Thus, states often pass statutes
that preempt local authority to affect the siting of such utilities.”).
38. Outside of greater Portland, Oregon’s growth management intervention is
conditional in nature. It conditions local planning on state approval, but land use
approvals are not granted by the State of Oregon. See Lesley R. Attkisson, Note, Putting a
Stop to Sprawl: State Intervention as a Tool for Growth Management, 62 VAND. L. REV.
979, 1001–02 (2009).
39. Anika Singh, Implementing Planned Development: The Case of New Jersey, 30
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 151, 193 (2005); see also Patricia E. Salkin, The Politics
of Land Use Reform in New York: Challenges and Opportunities, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
1041, 1050–51 (1999).
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are based on New Jersey’s Mount Laurel cases,40 strip or limit local
governments’ authority to zone affordable housing. These are based
on bad behavior by local government. They typically apply only when
the locality in question has failed to provide or zone for affordable
housing. While no other state supreme court has fully embraced the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s Mount Laurel doctrine, a few states
have passed milder statutory versions.41 Massachusetts adopted its
Anti-Snob Zoning Act in 1969.42 Connecticut followed in 1989.43 By
way of example, Connecticut’s Affordable Housing Appeals Act
shifts the burden in zoning appeals from would-be developers to
municipalities.44 If a municipality denies a land use approval for a
development that meets the state statutory definition of affordable
housing, the municipality bears the burden to prove that “(A) the
decision is necessary to protect substantial public interests in health,
safety or other matters which the commission may legally consider;
(B) such public interests clearly outweigh the need for affordable
housing; and (C) such public interests cannot be protected by
reasonable changes to the affordable housing development . . . .”45 In
a limited fashion, the state claws back the municipality’s authority to
zone and replaces it with the developer’s preferred land use plan,

40. I thank Bob Ellickson for the insight that while Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983), and
the New Jersey Fair Housing Act, ch. 222, 1985 N.J. Laws 996 (1985) (codified at N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 (Westlaw through L.2018, c. 140 and J.R. No. 12)) (responding
to Mount Laurel II), are clawback interventions, Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), and Oakwood at
Madison v. Township of Madison, 371 A.2d 1192 (N.J. 1977), receded from by Mount
Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983), which some read as a retreat from Mount Laurel I,
were actually deregulatory interventions. In Mount Laurel I and Oakwood, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey stripped growing municipalities of the authority to enact exclusionary
zoning but did not replace that municipal power with any kind of state authority. Only
later did the legislature replace local authority to zone with state authority to require
zoning for concrete numbers of affordable housing units.
41. See generally Brian R. Lerman, Note, Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning—The
Answer to the Affordable Housing Problem, B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 383 (2006)
(discussing the differences between mandatory inclusionary zoning approaches on the
East Coast and the West Coast of the United States).
42. Act of Aug. 23, 1969, ch. 774, 1969 Mass. Acts 712, 712–15 (codified as amended at
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20–23 (Westlaw through ch. 322 of the 2018 2d Ann.
Sess.)).
43. Act of June 29, 1989, Pub. Act No. 89-311, 1989 Conn. Acts 790, 790–92 (Reg.
Sess.) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-30g to 8-30j (Westlaw
through 2018 Feb. Reg. Sess.)).
44. Id.
45. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-30g(g) (Westlaw through 2018 Feb. Reg. Sess.).
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subject only to the locality evidencing “substantial public interests” in
favor of denying that plan.
4. Deregulatory Interventions
Finally, states limit the type, volume, or intensity of the
regulations local governments are permitted to impose. These
interventions do not claw back land use authority for use by the state
or its delegate. Instead, either as a formal or practical matter, these
powers are left unused by government, thus resulting in a
deregulatory state intervention. For example, Virginia simply
prohibits regulation of certain kinds of home-based commercial
fishing activities.46 This fourth type of intervention does not replace or
condition local authority; it simply forbids the application of land use
law to discrete subject matters. States, or in the case of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,47 the federal
government, simply prohibit land use regulation of certain discrete
subject matters.
C.

Contemporary Calls for Intervention

While economists and local law scholars are increasingly
cognizant of the ways in which local overregulation stymies the
national economy, local control continues to dominate our country’s
approach to land use policy.48 The structure of state and local
relations results in near-complete local control of major components
of nonfederal policy, including education, land use, and policing. “To
the extent that local governments understand the powers they

46. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2307.1 (2018) (“Registered commercial fishermen and
seafood buyers who operate their businesses from their waterfront residences shall not be
prohibited by a locality from continuing their businesses, notwithstanding the provisions of
any local zoning ordinance. This section shall only apply to businesses that have been in
operation by the current owner, or a family member of the current owner, for at least 20
years at the location in question. The protection granted by this section shall continue so
long as the property is owned by the current owner or a family member of the current
owner.”).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2012) (“No government shall impose or implement a
land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise
of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution–(A) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”).
48. See Briffault, supra note 5, at 2048; Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and
the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO.
L.J. 1985, 2048 (2000); see also supra text accompanying note 5.
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exercise as their powers, committed to them as a matter of a
seemingly pre-political right to self-determination, any effort by the
state to limit them is understood as a direct threat to local
autonomy.”49 And, “once this way of thinking about local control
takes hold, it is difficult to overcome.”50 In the author’s own
experience as an advocate, opponents of state interventions routinely
complain that the state seeks to encroach on local power. They never
concede that the state is simply reassuming authority that it originally
granted to local governments.51
Understanding why and how states have successfully undertaken
deregulatory state interventions should inform future policymaking in
this area. To that end, in Part II, I undertake a close examination of
four discrete legislative battles that have resulted in deregulatory and
clawback interventions in a substantial number of states. Based on
this examination, in Parts III and IV, I argue that states ought to take
more seriously their role as deregulatory actors in the land use
sphere.
II. INTERVENTIONS
Given the myriad problems that result from local control, it
might seem inevitable that states will eventually take up the mantle of
intervention. One scholar has argued that “[i]f local governments
continue to fail to exercise responsible land use decision-making, they
will likely forfeit the control and authority they currently possess to a
higher level of government.”52 But sound policymaking is hardly a
given. What follows is an attempt to understand why and when state
legislatures intervene to solve land use problems which are culturally,
historically, and often legally understood to be the province of local
governments.
The four land uses that are the subject of Part II were selected
after reviewing every state’s land use laws and identifying matters in
which a significant number of states imposed displacing interventions.

49. David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 397
(2001).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Neena Satija, 1990 Law Spurs Affordable Housing Development, and
Anxiety, CT MIRROR (July 5, 2012), http://ctmirror.org/2012/07/05/1990-law-spursaffordable-housing-development-and-anxiety/ [https://perma.cc/AJV2-E5D6] (describing
Connecticut’s Anti-Snob Zoning Act as “a state statute that interferes with the
sovereignty of towns”).
52. Salkin, supra note 39, at 1064.
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I then focused on the four uses described here: family day care
homes, manufactured housing, small-scale alternative energy
infrastructure, and group homes. Sometimes interventions appear not
in the zoning enabling act but elsewhere in a state’s statutes. For
example, an intervention in favor of group homes might appear in a
state’s social services law rather than the zoning enabling act. After
reading every state’s zoning enabling act and noting various uses that
states protected from local overregulation, I searched more broadly,
outside of zoning enabling acts. Once all of the states were identified,
I procured legislative history for nearly every relevant bill, including
initial enactments and later amendments.53 I did not search for, or
review, failed bills. The legislative history, supplemented by
newspaper accounts, was used not to interpret statutory meaning or
legislative intent but to understand which interests sought to advance
or halt the bill and which arguments in favor of the bill ultimately
convinced legislators to support it.54
Before considering each use in turn, an additional explanatory
note is appropriate. In many of the cases described below, a
displacing intervention requires that localities treat a certain land use
just as they treat single-family homes. Traditional American
Euclidean zoning55 establishes a hierarchy of uses. At the top are
single-family homes, which are presumed to have no negative
externalities and are, therefore, permitted in every zone. Thus
53. Availability of legislative history varies greatly by state. In some states, no records
were available other than bill text. Other states provided reams of transcribed legislative
testimony. Most provided something in between.
54. While it is tempting to try to deduce why some states intervene and others do not,
this is a very tricky question, particularly when considering multiple unrelated policies.
Intervening states are red and blue, large and small. They exist in all regions of the United
States. They include states in which local zoning is very restrictive and states in which local
zoning is less restrictive. These four land uses were selected in part on the basis that a wide
swath of states sought to protect them, and on that basis, they might say something about
states generally. They were not selected in an attempt to understand why some states and
not others intervene, though future work by myself or others might seek to elucidate those
differences.
55. The most fundamental feature of Euclidean zoning, so named for the case Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), is a rejection of mixed-use districts. In
addition, Euclidean zoning establishes a hierarchy of residences, excluding multifamily
housing from single-family zones but permitting single-family housing in multifamily
zones. The basic American zoning ordinance is a pyramid. At the top are the most
restrictive zones, which permit only single-family residences. As you go down the pyramid,
each zone permits the uses permitted in the more restrictive zones above. As a result,
single-family residences are permitted in every zone. At the bottom are the most inclusive
zones, which permit everything above plus potentially noxious uses, such as heavy industry
and junkyards.
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requiring local governments to treat a use just as they treat singlefamily homes constitutes deregulation.
A. Family Day Care Homes
The debate whether to protect family day care homes from land
use regulation occurred in multiple states over the course of the 1980s
and early 1990s. State agencies responsible for ensuring that child
care facilities met public health and safety requirements began to
understand that local regulations undermined their mission. The local
regulations did not contradict state regulations, and they did not
overlap in subject matter or scope. As a result, normal preemption
and home rule doctrines did not apply. Nevertheless, local regulations
made it harder for state bureaucrats to advance their own function—
namely, inspecting and licensing home-based day cares. As a result,
perhaps counterintuitively, state bureaucrats became key advocates
for deregulation.
In many countries, home-based occupations and small-scale
commercial activities are considered “residential” in nature and are
permitted as of right in residential zones.56 Such is not the case in the
United States.57 For much of this country’s history, working from
home was the norm. With the advent of the industrial revolution,
however, work and home became separate locations for a significant
number of workers. Euclidean zoning,58 itself a response to the
industrial revolution, codified and exacerbated the separation.59
American zoning ordinances address the possibility that
nonresidential uses will inflict negative externalities on residential
neighborhoods by banning nonresidential uses entirely. Some have
noted in this context that outright prohibition is a heavy-handed
approach to regulation. Nicole Stelle Garnett, for example, argues
that these restrictions go farther than necessary to protect legitimate
56. SONIA A. HIRT, ZONED IN THE USA: THE ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
AMERICAN LAND-USE REGULATION 60–89 (2014).
57. Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning Laws and the HomeBusiness Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1205–10 (2001) (summarizing zoning
restrictions on home businesses “in a nutshell”).
58. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
59. Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012), also worked to
codify the separation by prohibiting certain categories of work in an employee’s home.
This prohibition is intended to facilitate enforcement of wage and hour laws that might
otherwise be skirted in the context of piecework. FLSA does not prohibit either a business
owner or salaried employee from using his or her home for commercial purposes. In these
cases, the operative prohibition is local zoning.
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local interests in preventing negative externalities.60 She proposes that
local governments regulate those externalities rather than prohibit
home businesses altogether.61
Garnett argues in favor of easing restrictions on small business.62
Bans on home business ignore the “dot com revolution” and are
archaic. Home businesses allow working parents to care for their
children while earning an income. One primary concern of land use
planners, easing traffic, is advanced by home business, many of whose
workers walk ten steps rather than drive ten miles to work. Advocates
make additional arguments in favor of deregulation: home businesses
provide a necessary entry point for start-up enterprises without
sufficient capital to pay rent, and “[h]ome-based businesses also bring
goods and services into areas whose needs are not being met because
they are far from commercial centers.”63 Some local governments,
seeking to facilitate entrepreneurial activity, have eased land use
restrictions barring home-based small business activities.64 But these
local governments are the exception rather than the rule. Most
continue to prohibit home-based work in residential districts, and, for
the most part, states have not intervened.65
There is an exception. In the case of family day cares, eighteen
states preempt local zoning.66 Family day care homes are child care
60. See Garnett, supra note 57, at 1239 (“[T]he zoning restrictions on home
businesses, like all zoning rules, are not designed solely to prevent externalities.”).
61. Id. at 1240.
62. See id. at 1197–98.
63. Garrett Atherton, Half of US Businesses are Home-Based. So Why Do Some
Cities Want to Kill Them?, INST. FOR JUST. (May 5, 2015), http://ij.org/action-post/half-ofus-businesses-are-home-based-so-why-do-some-cities-want-to-kill-them/ [https://perma.cc/
D5KT-D94F].
64. Nicole Hong, More and More There’s No Place Like Home for Small Firms,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323734304578
543600308218768 [https://perma.cc/NNZ3-4ZH6 (dark archive)].
65. However, states like Maryland and Vermont have laws that allow home-based
work in residential districts. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 21-330.1 (LEXIS
through 2018 Reg. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 3302(39) (LEXIS through 1st Spec. Sess.
of 2018).
66. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1597.40–.465 (West Supp. 2018); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 8-3e, 8-3f, 8-3j (Westlaw through 2018 Feb. Reg. Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 125.0109 (West Supp. 2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-15.35 (Westlaw through Act
220 of the 2018 Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-4-1108 (Westlaw through 2018 2d
Reg. Sess. and 1st Spec. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.3206 (Westlaw through
2018 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.357 (Subd. 7) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg.
Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-2-412 (Westlaw through Oct. 1, 2017 sess.); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 43-2616 (Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of 105th Leg.); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:55D-66.5b (Westlaw through L.2018, c. 140 and J.R. No. 12); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW
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centers operated out of a residence, typically the provider’s home. If
anything, home-based day cares are more likely than other home
businesses to impose on their neighborhoods the sort of negative
externalities Garnett believes support reasonable local regulation.
Children are loud.67 Parents are likely to pick up and drop off their
children in a car at rush hour, creating traffic concerns.68 Family day
cares sometimes employ staff who do not live in the home and
commute by car. Why, then, is this the one type of home business that
benefits from state-granted zoning relief in eighteen states?
Day care providers forced to seek approvals from local land use
boards face an uphill battle. Land use boards are famously responsive
to homeowners’ concerns that uses other than single-family homes
might decrease their property values.69 Darlene Feldman, a Michigan
day care provider and advocate, fought zoning battles on the local
level but found that many towns refused to permit “day care in their
neighborhoods because they’re concerned about property values
decreasing.”70
§ 390(12)(a) (McKinney 2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5104.054 (LEXIS through SB
221 of 132d Gen. Assemb.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329A.440 (Westlaw through 2018
Reg. Sess. & 2018 Spec. Sess.); 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-37(b) (LEXIS through Jan.
2018 Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4412(5) (LEXIS through 1st Spec. Sess. of 2018); VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.2-2291 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 35.63.185(1), 36.70.757(1)
(Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.1017 (Westlaw through 2017
Act 370). These statutes do not explicitly address restrictions on home businesses included
in restrictive covenants, homeowner association rules, condominium documents, and
residential leases. Courts in some states have disallowed such restrictions, finding that they
are against public policy. They have based that finding, in part, on the states’ prohibition
on local zoning restrictions undermining family day care operations. See, e.g., Quinones v.
Bd. of Managers of Regalwalk Condo. I, 673 N.Y.S.2d 450, 453–54 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(concluding that a condominium declaration prohibiting the operation of family day cares
is barred by public policy and unenforceable (citing N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 390
(McKinney 2018)).
67. Kathy Prentice, Disquiet on the Home Day-Care Front: Proposal to Challenge
Zoning Restrictions, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 4, 1988, at 1G [hereinafter Prentice,
Disquiet on the Home Day-Care Front] (citing neighbors’ opposition to a home-based day
care in Hazel Park, Michigan, on the basis that “the children’s presence created traffic and
noise”).
68. Patricia Anstett, Burgeoning Day Care Demand Spotlights Debate over Zoning,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 9, 1988, at 3A (quoting attorney for Gross Pointe Woods,
stating that local zoning did not permit day care homes in residential neighborhoods
because “it generates a great deal of motor vehicle traffic, and it’s the operation of a
business out of a residence”).
69. FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 3.
70. Kathy Prentice, Home Care: About a Quarter of a Million Michigan Children
Spend Their Weekdays in Unregulated Day Care Programs, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr.
14, 1987, at 1B [hereinafter Prentice, Home Care].
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Even if a provider entertained a hope of prevailing before a local
land use board, he or she faced prohibitively high entry costs. As a
1990 New York Times article described, family day care providers are
often “discovered after an angry neighbor files a complaint and then
they are treated as illegal businesses in residential zones. It is possible
to circumvent zoning by applying for variance. But this can be a
complicated process lasting months and costing thousands of dollars
in legal fees.”71
A Connecticut provider told the Hartford Courant, “[w]e’re not
getting rich for what we do, so for us to spend the money and go
before several boards is hard.”72 In Washington State, a state
employee described “get[ting] calls from women—often nearly in
tears—who find out they will have to spend up to $500 for a [local
zoning] permit after they have already received the [State of
Washington] licensing[.]”73 Citing not just financial costs but the value
of providers’ time, Feldman asked the Detroit Free Press, “[h]ow do
you change the world when you’re busy changing diapers?”74 The
Detroit Free Press documented multiple instances of family day care
providers seeking land use approvals, only to be denied in the face of
local opposition from nearby homeowners.75 One such provider, while
waiting for her case to be resolved in court, stopped watching children
in her own house. Instead, she commuted to “one of her day-care
families’ homes. If she stops by her own house during the day, [she]

71. Anthony DePalma, When Day Care Clashes with Zoning Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
6, 1990, at B6. One recent study reports that the average family day care provider grosses
just $20,000 to $25,000 a year while incurring operating expenses of up to $15,000, greatly
limiting providers’ ability to pay significant application or licensing fees or to pay
attorneys to help them navigate complicated regulatory processes. See WILLIAM WAITE
ET AL., CONN. CTR. FOR ECON. ANALYSIS, ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE
AOK
FAMILY
CHILD
CARE
LICENSING
PROGRAM
21,
23
(2011),
https://webshare.business.uconn.edu/ccea/studies/CCEA_AOK-EconImpact_2011jul.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T493-VK9Q]. A variance is a site-specific permission to deviate from the
applicable zoning ordinance where application of the ordinance to the site would result in
some hardship. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-3d, 8-6 (Westlaw through 2018 Feb.
Reg. Sess.).
72. Ann Marsh, State Opinion Limits Local Restrictions on Home Day Care,
HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 16, 1990, at C13B.
73. Children’s Bill Wins More Praise, SPOKANE DAILY CHRON., Feb. 8, 1989, at A2.
74. Prentice, Home Care, supra note 70.
75. Kathy Prentice, Day Care Operators in Conflict with Zoning, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Feb. 25, 1988, at 7A; Prentice, Disquiet on the Home Day-Care Front, supra note
67; see also Kim Murphy, Supervisors Approve Zoning Amendment to Ease the Licensing
of Day-Care Homes, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1984, at R6.
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‘has to pull our car way up front so nobody can see her and sneak
them (the children) in,’” her husband told the Detroit Free Press.76
Even in the face of these regulatory hurdles, some proponents of
family day care hesitated to advance a deregulatory solution. In a
1972 report funded by the Federal Office of Economic Opportunity,
advocates identified zoning as an unnecessary obstacle to the
development of day care centers. The report found that “municipal
planning people” considered day care a “‘problem use,’ to be
permitted only under certain careful conditions.”77 As a result, local
governments excluded day cares from residential zones, so as to
protect residential uses from the “commercial” provision of child
care, but also excluded day cares from commercial and industrial
zones, so as to protect children from commercial and industrial uses.78
Counterintuitively, the report found that “the better a job of zoning
and planning a city is doing, the more obstacles it is creating for the
care of its children.”79 Underlying this claim is an assumption that
more regulations are generally “better.” Consistent with that view,
the task force rejected displacing interventions and instead advocated
“reaching local planning people with educational materials through
their professional organizations, meeting with local citizens, and the
state and federal agencies to which they relate, to bring about changes
in local zoning regulations and philosophy.”80 The task force accepted
that “zoning is a local responsibility and function”81 and sought to
influence local decision-making rather than reallocate decisionmaking power.
Unlike the Day Care and Child Development Council of
America, the Cato Institute did not hesitate to advocate deregulatory
state intervention that sought to prohibit local governments from
using zoning to regulate day care facilities serving six or fewer
children.82 A 1985 Cato Institute report cites local zoning as an
76. Prentice, Disquiet on the Home Day-Care Front, supra note 67.
77. Gwen G. Morgan, Preface to DAY CARE & CHILD DEV. COUNCIL OF AM., INC.,
MODELS FOR DAY CARE LICENSING: CHILD CARE BULLETIN NO. 8: ZONING FOR DAY
CARE 2 (1972).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 7.
82. KAREN LEHRMAN & JANA PACE, CATO INST., DAY-CARE REGULATION:
SERVING CHILDREN OR BUREAUCRATS? (1985), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa059.html
[https://perma.cc/4LZU-V8JA] (endorsing “preemption statutes to exempt family day-care
homes from local zoning ordinances”). At the time the report was published, six states had
adopted such statutes. Id.
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especially egregious example of overregulation.83 The report also
found that state licensing and minimum staffing ratios increased the
cost of day care but found, ultimately, that “[t]he highest hurdle
facing family providers is often the first—obtaining the approval of
local zoning officials.”84 The report authors opined that zoning
regulations, being both onerous and useless, exacerbated the
problem.85 The report argued that zoning restrictions were irrelevant
to any legitimate aims of regulation: “[O]f all local day-care
regulations, however, zoning statutes have the least relevance to the
quality of care and the safety of the children.”86 Exacerbating the
likelihood that regulations would be used for purposes irrelevant to
the quality of care provided to children, local zoning board hearings
provided a forum for “neighborhood squabbling” and “the airing of
neighborhood tensions unrelated to the issue of child care.”87
Advocates took the route suggested by Cato. At the state capitol,
day care providers had the opportunity to fight the battle once. If they
won, they put an end to repeated local battles at which individual
providers were often outgunned by neighbors. California,
Connecticut, Florida, Michigan, and Washington provide
representative examples of the debates and storytelling that
accompanied state interventions intended to protect family day care
providers from overzealous zoning.
In 1987, Connecticut88 enacted a prohibition on any local zoning
regulation that “PROHIBIT[ED] THE OPERATION OF ANY
FAMILY DAY CARE HOME, CHILD DAY CARE CENTER OR

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. While I have not reviewed local zoning ordinances to confirm that towns actually
comply with any of the prohibitions described in this Article, it is almost certainly true that
some do not and that affected property owners may be unaware that the prohibited zoning
regulations are unenforceable. See Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, A Room of
One’s Own? Accessory Dwelling Unit Reforms and Local Parochialism, 45 URB. LAW.
519, 523–24 (2013) (finding that localities subject to state deregulatory interventions
intended to encourage the development of accessory dwelling units “have responded to
local political pressures by delaying the enactment of local ADU legislation (and, in a few
cases, simply refusing to do so despite the state mandate), imposing burdensome
procedural requirements that are contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the state-law
requirement that ADUs be permitted ‘as of right,’ requiring multiple off-street parking
spaces, and imposing substantive and procedural design requirements”).
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GROUP DAY CARE HOME IN A RESIDENTIAL ZONE.”89 The
explicit “statement of purpose” was “[t]o prohibit the restrictive
zoning of family day care homes, child day care centers and group day
care homes.”90
Connecticut’s deregulatory intervention on behalf of family day
care providers was not motivated by a desire to decrease the cost of
doing business. Instead, legislators were concerned with the indirect
consequences of local land use prohibitions on family day care homes.
Legislators worried that providers might not seek state licensure for
fear of bringing their business operations to the attention of local
zoning authorities.91 Instead of seeking licensure, providers would
then operate unlicensed day care homes.
Thus, local regulations threatened a state agency’s policy agenda,
but not because the local regulations addressed matters also regulated
by the state. Local governments did not attempt to impose one set of
safety requirements on family day care homes while the state imposed
another. Instead, local law forced day care homes underground. The
threat of falling afoul of local zoning authorities encouraged or
required family day care homes to operate without a state license.
When family day care homes operate without a state license, the state
loses its opportunity to perform background checks on providers and
confirm that the home meets safety requirements. As the sponsoring
legislator stated on the floor of the Connecticut House of
Representatives, “[t]he problems that we found in the state is that the
majority of these classes of day care centers presently are
underground, where we have no control of what’s happening and no
inspections to protect the young children in these homes.”92 This

89. An Act Concerning the Zoning of Child Day Care Facilities, Pub. Act 87-232, § 82, 1987 Conn. Acts 317, 317–18 (Reg. Sess.) (1987) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 8-2 (Westlaw through 2018 Feb. Reg. Sess.)).
90. Comm. B. 441, 1987 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 1987).
91. Connecticut’s licensure process includes background checks on the provider and
any other residents of the home as well as a safety check of the home itself. CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 19a-87b(a), (c) (Westlaw through 2018 Feb. Reg. Sess.). It also sets a
maximum number of children who can be enrolled at any time (typically up to six children
total, four of whom must be at least two years old). Id. § 19a-77(a)(3). While family and
group day care homes are subject to regulations regarding their operations, they are not
subject to any building code requirements beyond what is required for residences, whether
single or multifamily.
92. An Act Concerning the Zoning of Child Day Care Facilities: Hearing on S.B. 441
Before the H. Comm. on Planning and Dev., 1987 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 5489 (Conn.
1987) [hereinafter Hearing on S.B. 441] (statement of Rep. Gelsi).
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concern is echoed in the 1985 Cato Institute report described above.93
Cato worried about market inefficiencies, specifically that parents
would have trouble finding “underground” day cares and that many
would-be providers simply would not enter the market at all.94
In the Connecticut legislature, lawmakers focused on the safety
risks associated with unregulated family day cares:
We’re either going to put them in places where people are
going to have the courage to get licensed so that we know
where they’re at, or we’re going to keep them underground and
I think to keep the[m] underground is going to be a shame and
the first time that something goes wrong in one of those
unlicensed homes, I can tell you what the screaming in this
Chamber is going to be. We got to get them licensed and we got
to regulate them.95
Lawmakers echoed bureaucrats’ longstanding concerns. Four
years earlier, Connecticut’s director of the Office of Child Day Care,
Frances Roberts, told the New York Times that in the face of
stringent local requirements, “the number of homes may diminish or
they may go underground.”96
The same debate occurred in Florida, Michigan, California, and
Washington, all of which similarly require that family day cares be
permitted in residential zones.97 The primary supporting argument in
favor of the Michigan bill, for example, was that “the alternative to
[bill passage], i.e. exclusionary zoning laws that drive child care homes
underground, is unacceptable.”98 One licensed provider told the
Detroit Free Press that she worried that prohibitive zoning laws
prevented unlicensed providers from seeking licensure: “Our fear is
that with mallets over their heads, providers are not going to step
forward to be licensed.”99
93. Cato estimated that “90 percent of home day-care providers operate without a
license” and found that “[t]he most frequently cited reason for ‘going underground’ is the
complex and costly maze of requirements that must be met.” LEHRMAN & PACE, supra
note 82.
94. Id.
95. Hearing on S.B. 441, supra note 92, at 5493–94 (statement of Rep. Gelsi).
96. Andree Brooks, Child-Care Homes Divide Communities, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
1984, at C1.
97. For the time period in question, Connecticut makes available transcripts of the
Connecticut General Assembly’s floor discussions and some committee hearings. Many
other states provide only minutes of these meetings.
98. MICH. SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, BILL ANALYSIS: S.B. 687, 688, & 689 (1988).
99. Prentice, Home Care, supra note 70.
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Bureaucrats’ and advocates’ fears regarding unlicensed family
day cares were not simply theoretical. In Massachusetts, the Town of
Norwood’s building inspector used a list of family day care providers
registered with the state’s Office of Children to find the providers in
violation of local law.100 In Florida, state law required registered
providers to comply with all local laws. As a result, county officials
refused to register family day care providers who resided in
municipalities that prohibited family day care.101 When a bill
removing local authority to zone family day cares passed the
legislature, the director of Broward County’s Social Services
Division’s Child Care Unit “predicted that many mothers caring for
children in areas where it is illegal ‘are now going to come out of the
woodwork.’”102 In short, across states, local laws repeatedly
undermined the state’s requirement that family day care providers
register and undergo background checks.
Not surprisingly then, bureaucrats led the charge to remove local
authority to use land use laws to prohibit family day cares. In
Michigan, the state’s own Department of Social Services was the bill’s
primary proponent.103 On the floor of the Michigan Legislature, bill
sponsors bemoaned the fact that “[i]t is often because the operators
of such homes, generally women with families, have tried to comply
with the State licensing requirements that the existence of the homes
has become public knowledge and the operators have become the
targets of complaints and harassment.”104 The Michigan Bill Analysis
estimated that “there are as many as eight ‘underground’ homes for
each licensed home” and queried whether “such a situation, i.e.,
100. Kay Longcope, Day Care and the Zoning Laws, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 28, 1983, at 15.
Massachusetts responded to local objections to proposed displacing interventions by
adopting a default rule favoring family child care rather than adopting a true displacing
intervention. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 3 (Westlaw through ch. 322 of the 2018 2d
Ann. Sess.) (“Family child care home and large family child care home, as defined in
section 1A of chapter 15D, shall be an allowable use unless a city or town prohibits or
specifically regulates such use in its zoning ordinances or by-laws.”).
101. Jenni Bergal, Political Infighting Stalls Day Care Bill, SUN-SENTINAL (Tallahassee
May 10, 1986), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1986-05-10/news/8601280280_1_day-carefamily-day-care-homes [https://perma.cc/MH5H-4EAJ].
102. Rick Pierce, Senate Passes Home Day-Care Bill, SUN-SENTINAL (Tallahasee June
5, 1986), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1986-06-05/news/8602030051_1_home-day-day-carecare-operators [https://perma.cc/468R-3R6B].
103. MICH. HOUSE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS SECTION, BILL ANALYSIS: SENATE
BILLS 687–89 (1988). Other proponents included the Michigan Trial Lawyers Association,
various child care associations, and a parents’ group.
104. MICH. SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, supra note 98; see also supra text accompanying
note 98.
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unlicensed, unregulated homes [should] be permitted to continue or
should the operators of these homes be encouraged to apply for
licensure with the assurance that they will not be subject to
exclusionary zoning laws?”105
The desire to increase the availability of “day care for single
family parents and/or two parents that are working”106 provided an
additional motivation for intervention.107 In all of these states, the
notion that family day cares serve children’s and parents’ needs
provided only a secondary motivation. In Connecticut, no legislator
mentioned quality early childhood care on the floor or in a committee
meeting. Just one person testified on this point before the
committee.108 Similarly, the desire to eliminate a barrier to
entrepreneurship surfaced in just one piece of handwritten testimony
in Connecticut and in no other state.109 These were secondary
arguments. The primary argument in favor of intervention was
advancing state bureaucratic functions.
While state agencies with regulatory oversight over family day
care providers supported these bills, the opposition included the
municipal lobby and various individual towns and neighborhood
associations.110 The opposition argued that the bill “would set a
precedent of allowing State interests to supersede local zoning
interests which take into account the various types and needs of
communities.”111 In other words, the state’s solution failed to account
for the on-the-ground facts in different towns, knowledge held by and
best applied by each local zoning authority. In addition, opponents
105. MICH. SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, supra note 98 (assuaging the fears of those who
might argue that day care centers would attract traffic, trespassers, and other annoyances).
106. Hearing on S.B. 441, supra note 92, at 5489 (statement of Rep. Gelsi).
107. The bill was part of a package of bills, others of which more explicitly and directly
furthered the goal of creating additional day care slots in the state. Id.; see Work and
Family Agenda: Mar. 12, 1987, Hearing Before the J. Standing Comm. on Family & the
Workplace, 1987 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 5 (Conn. 1987) (statement of Ms. Simon).
108. Work and Family Agenda: Mar. 10, 1987, Hearing Before the J. Standing Comm.
on Family & the Workplace, 1987 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 725 (Conn. 1987) (statement
of Gail Hamm) (“It is clear that children should be cared for in areas of town where there
are trees—not asphalt. Where there is grass, rather than traffic. Child care facilities belong
in residential areas. There is a clear state purpose and necessity to provide greater quality
and quantity of day care and we encourage you to do your best.”).
109. Id. at 750 (statement arguing that inconsistent regulations across jurisdictions put
providers out of business).
110. See, e.g., MICH. HOUSE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS SECTION, supra note 103; Daniel
B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 642–45 (2001) (discussing
how local governments are very effective lobbyists of state government).
111. MICH. SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, supra note 98.
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objected to “usurping local planning and local zoning to achieve a
special interest” and argued that the bill undermined democracy by
“cutting out the local units of government; cutting out the
neighborhoods.”112 One objector testified that the bill constituted a
“derogation of the homeowners rights to live on a piece of property
which is zoned residential . . . .”113
Intervention statutes did not, however, ignore all local concerns.
They simply required local regulation to be tailored to specific local
concerns. While Michigan, for example, required towns to permit
family day cares in residential zones, it gave credence to certain local
concerns regarding larger group day cares.114 Towns are required to
permit larger home-based day cares only if they meet state statutory
criteria intended to address various local concerns.115 Larger facilities
must be dispersed.116 They must meet certain parameters set by the
state with respect to hours of operation, parking, and signage.117 But
they must also meet local parameters: they must have appropriate
fencing “as determined by the local unit of government”118 and must
be maintained “consistent with the visible characteristics of the
neighborhood.”119
The sphere of local influence is limited but not eliminated. In
essence, the state identifies discrete legitimate issues of local concern
and incorporates them into the statute. It acknowledges that there
may be negative externalities at the local level. Rather than allow the
locality to prohibit the use, which would result in the loss of positive
externalities experienced at the state level, it requires localities to
tailor their regulation to the local impacts acknowledged by the
statute.120 This kind of intervention—refusing local regulators the
power to prohibit a use but permitting them to regulate certain
enumerated aspects of that use—is an example of a tailoring
requirement that limits local authority to regulate land use to narrow

112. 2 S. JOURNAL, 1988 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2853 (Mich. 1988).
113. Id. at 2852.
114. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.3206(4) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.).
115. Id.
116. A group day care is not entitled to a permit unless it is as least 1500 feet from a
community-based institution, such as a substance abuse treatment facility, halfway house,
or another group day care. Id.
117. Id. § 125.3206(4)(d)–(f).
118. Id. § 125.3206(b).
119. Id. § 125.3206(c).
120. FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 3 (distinguishing between
liability rules at the state level and property rules at the local level).
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requirements intended to address truly local impacts. That model will
reprise throughout the three remaining legislative history case studies.
B.

Manufactured Housing

Manufactured homes, or mobile homes, are factory-built
structures that require minimal assembly on-site to render them
habitable. They may be placed upon a foundation or tied down upon
delivery. But the bulk of the construction process takes place off-site,
in a factory. Because they are factory built, they are mass produced
and benefit from economies of scale and assembly line methods. As a
result, they are less expensive to construct than the alternative,
known in contrast as site-built homes.121 Some portion of these cost
savings pass down to the consumer. Manufactured housing has long
served as unsubsidized affordable housing for low- and moderateincome people.122
As evidenced by zoning codes, manufactured homes are
perceived by local regulators to be less aesthetically pleasing and of
lower quality than site-built homes. “[Z]oning laws . . . treat
[manufactured homes] differently from conventional site-built homes.
Zoning boards routinely push [manufactured home] parks to
undesirable, low-property-value areas.”123 Fearing that these homes
will lower the values of nearby properties, municipal governments use
land use regulations to relegate manufactured homes to designated
mobile home parks or to prohibit them altogether. As a result, local
regulations restrict availability of a less expensive alternative to sitebuilt housing, thus inflating housing costs.
Local governments regulate manufactured housing for many of
the same reasons that they regulate land uses, even single-family
residential uses, generally. First, precisely because it is less expensive,
manufactured housing yields less in property taxes than site-built
single-family homes.124 Fiscal zoning—using land use regulation to
121. See Ann M. Burkhart, Taxing Manufactured Homes, 67 TAX LAW. 909, 912–13
(2014).
122. Id. at 909 (“Manufactured homes (commonly called mobile homes) are the most
important form of unsubsidized affordable housing in this country. They are home to more
than 22 million people. The residents are predominantly lower-income, including a large
proportion of older people.”).
123. Amy J. Schmitz, Promoting the Promise Manufactured Homes Provide for
Affordable Housing, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 384, 395
(2004) (footnotes omitted).
124. Id. (“Historically, zoning boards shunned [manufactured homes] because they
were taxed as vehicles and therefore drained community services without contributing to
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maximize property tax revenues while minimizing local
expenditures—is hardly limited to manufactured housing.
Local governments also regulate manufactured housing in an
effort to preserve property values.125 Undergirding much of local
zoning law is an assumption that a neighborhood’s property values
will fall and rise in concert. The value of a well-maintained singlefamily home will turn in large part on whether it is adjacent to
another well-maintained single-family home, a junkyard, or
something in between. Both because they are responsive to the
concerns of existing residents and, due to fiscal zoning concerns, local
governments seek to ensure that property values are high. If local
governments perceive manufactured housing to be more akin to a
junkyard than to a well-maintained single-family home, they may
prohibit manufactured housing entirely. Alternatively, towns can
segregate them from other residential communities. Zoning codes
that require manufactured housing to be located in mobile home
parks or limit manufactured housing to multifamily, commercial, or
industrial zones seek to protect single-family homes from the
possibility that property values in the most exclusive neighborhoods,
those zoned for single-family use only, will decline as a result of the
presence of manufactured housing.126
These policy considerations are precisely those that drive much
local residential zoning. They are no more or less sensible than zoning
codes that require minimum built square footage,127 regulate
aesthetics,128 or establish minimum lot sizes,129 all restrictions that seek
local property tax revenues in the same manner as real estate. Although [manufactured
homes] are now taxed as real estate, policy makers continue to justify [manufactured
homes] zoning restrictions based on [manufactured homes’] inability to generate property
tax revenues on par with conventional homes.”).
125. See, e.g., Tex. Manufactured Hous. Ass’n v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095,
1097 (5th Cir. 1996); Mar. 24, 1999, Hearing on S.B. 323 Before the S. Comm. on Gov’t
Affairs, 1999 Leg., 70th Sess. 5–6 (Nev. 1999) [hereinafter Mar. 24 Hearing on S.B. 323]
(detailing how one commenter on the subject believed it was only a myth that
manufactured housing depressed property values and cited to several studies); id. at 20
(detailing the opinions of one lobbyist on the subject who believed “it would be unfair [to
allow manufactured housing] to property owners who have relied on established law in
making substantial investments in property”).
126. See Schmitz, supra note 123, at 395.
127. 3 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER. ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING § 54:11 (4th ed. 2005).
128. See generally Anika Singh Lemar, Zoning as Taxidermy: Neighborhood
Conservation Districts and the Regulation of Aesthetics, 90 IND. L.J. 1525 (2015)
(summarizing the history of aesthetic zoning and noting that the advent of zoning
provisions singularly focused on aesthetics of residential neighborhoods post-1980).
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to protect property values and, as a result, increase and inflate
housing prices.
Nevertheless, over thirty states restrict local authority to regulate
manufactured housing.130 The vast majority of these states otherwise
impose no meaningful restrictions on local regulation of housing.131
While advocates and scholars cite manufactured housing’s price point
as its primary benefit, clearly something other than simple concern for
affordability drives these state laws.
States do not follow a single model when restricting local ability
to regulate manufactured housing.132 Generally these statutes restrict
129. See generally Gavin L. Phillips, Annotation, Validity of Zoning Laws Setting
Minimum Lot Size Requirements, 1 A.L.R. 5th 622 (1992) (dealing with minimum lot size
requirements as a form of municipal density control).
130. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-54-1604 (LEXIS through 2018 2d Extraordinary Sess.);
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65852.3, .11 (West 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 31-23-303(3), 30-28115 (LEXIS through 2018 Legis. Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 553.35, .38 (West 2019); GA.
CODE ANN. § 8-2-112 (2015); IDAHO CODE § 67-6509B (LEXIS through 2018 Reg. Sess.);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 335.30, 414.28 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-763 (Westlaw through July 1, 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100.348(3) (Westlaw
through 2018 Reg. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4358 (Westlaw through 2d
Spec. Sess. of 128th Leg.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.2307 (Westlaw through
P.A.2018, No. 361, also 367, of 2018 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.25, 462.357
(Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-1-39 (Westlaw through 2018
Reg. and 1st Extraordinary Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-202, -302 (Westlaw through
Oct. 1, 2017 sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-402, 23-114 (Westlaw through 2d Reg.
Sess. of 105th Leg.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 278.02095, .02325 (Westlaw through 79th
Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:32 (Westlaw through ch. 379 of 2018 Reg. Sess.);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-104 to -105 (Westlaw through L.2018, c. 140 and J.R. No. 12);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-21A-3 (Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of 53rd Leg.); N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 616 (McKinney Supp. 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-341.1, 160A-383.1 (2017);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 303.212, 519.212 (LEXIS through SB 221 of 132d Gen.
Assemb.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 197.312, .314, .480, .493 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg.
and Spec. Sess. of 79th Legis. Assemb.); 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10604 (Westlaw through
2018 Reg. Sess. Acts 1 to 153 and 155 to 164); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-43-130 (2018); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 11-10-5 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. and Spec. Sess.); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 13-24-201 (LEXIS through 2018 Reg. Sess.); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§§ 231.074, .104, .133 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. and 1st Called Sess. of 85th Leg.);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9a-514, 17-27a-513 (LEXIS through 2018 2d Spec. Sess.); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4412 (LEXIS through 2018 1st Spec. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 35.21.684, 36.01.225 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8A-7-2
(Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.).
131. California, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania are exceptions. See
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65852.3, .11 (West 2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:32 (Westlaw
through ch. 379 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-104 to -105 (Westlaw
through L.2018, c. 140 and J.R. No. 12); 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10604 (Westlaw through
2018 Reg. Sess. Acts 1 to 153 and 155 to 164).
132. S. Mark White, State and Federal Planning Legislation and Manufactured
Housing: New Opportunities for Affordable, Single-Family Shelter, 28 URB. LAW. 263,
267–69 (1996) (“State anti-discrimination laws directed to manufactured homes generally
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the ability of local governments to treat manufactured housing
differently from site-built housing. These statutes permit local
governments to subject manufactured housing to generally applicable
zoning requirements, including height restrictions, setback
requirements, and aesthetic mandates. They do not allow local
governments to single out manufactured housing for additional
regulation, though some permit very limited bulk and aesthetic
restrictions particular to manufactured housing.133
All of these bills passed despite sentiment, expressed in both
public hearing testimony and floor debate, that they unnecessarily
interfered with local control of land use regulation. As one municipal
official argued before the Washington State Legislature, they
“preempt[] the ability of a local government to make zoning decisions
that serve the best interests of the community. Zoning should
continue to be a matter of local control and there is no need for the
state to intervene with respect to manufactured homes.”134
Nevada’s statute, and its legislative history, is typical of
displacing interventions that favor manufactured housing. As a result
of legislation passed in 1999, Nevada defines the term single-family
residence to include manufactured homes, provided those homes
meet certain state mandates.135 Just as Connecticut deregulated family
day cares by requiring local governments to permit them in
residential (including single-family) districts, Nevada deregulated
manufactured housing by requiring that it be permitted in those very
same zones.136 The Nevada statute, like the California alternative
tend to follow four models: accommodation legislation, equal treatment legislation,
residential districting legislation, and legislation barring the complete exclusion of
manufactured homes from a community.”).
133. E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65852.3 (West 2018); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-402
(Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of 105th Leg.). Nebraska allows local governments the
option to impose requirements for a minimum square footage of nine hundred feet, a
minimum roof pitch, and a nonreflective roof. § 14-402. In addition, Nebraska permits
local governments to subject manufactured housing to architectural design regulations so
long as such apply to all housing in the relevant zone. Id. California permits manufacturedhousing-specific regulation of roof overhang, roof material, and siding material, but the
requirements vis a vis material cannot “exceed” those applicable to site-built housing.
§ 65852.3.
134. H.B. REP. ON S.B. 6593, 2004 Leg., 58th Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2004),
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2003-04/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/6593.HBR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HJ35-F2S5] (summarizing Mark Brown’s testimony before the State of
Washington’s House Committee on Local Government).
135. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.02095 (Westlaw through 79th Reg. Sess.).
136. Id. As a general matter, American zoning codes do not set density floors on
residential housing. As a result, while multifamily homes may be prohibited from single-
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energy statute described below and the Michigan family child care
statute described above, validates local aesthetic concerns. The
statute itself sets state standards for certain aesthetic elements.137 It
then imposes tailoring requirements, restricting local regulation to
certain enumerated aesthetic considerations including siding
materials, roofing materials, and covering above-ground
foundations.138
Introducing the bill in committee, Senator Mark E. Amodei
presented the bill as a deregulatory intervention, one that would undo
restrictions on industry and limitations on consumer choice that
undermined free markets and affordability.139 He almost immediately
anticipated the objection that the bill undermined “local control.”140
He argued, however, that “whether [a structure] is a stick-built home
or a manufactured home,” “the land uses are identical.”141 As a result,
local control of land use is not undermined by requiring similar
treatment of manufactured and site-built homes.
Amodei framed his argument in terms of both equity to the
manufactured home industry and the manufactured home resident,
stating that “I think there are good reasons for the evolution of this
industry to be given a fair shot at giving people a choice.”142
Manufactured housing, like alternative energy infrastructure, but
unlike family day care homes, is represented in state legislatures by
an industry lobby that can seek to combat the influence of lobbyists
representing local governments. That lobbying force includes both
manufacturers and the various professional service organizations that
are employed by them.143 Indeed, the Nevada Manufactured Housing

family zones, single-family homes are nearly always permitted in multifamily zones. See
Sonia Hirt, The Devil is in the Definitions: Contrasting American and German Approaches
to Zoning, 73 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 436, 439 (2007).
137. The Nevada statute applies only to manufactured housing units that are 1200
square feet or larger. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.02095(2)(a)(5) (Westlaw through 79th
Reg. Sess.).
138. The statute further limits such regulations by providing that these standards must
be objective and documented clearly and must not be adopted to discourage or impede the
construction or provision of affordable housing, including, without limitation, the use of
manufactured homes for affordable housing. Id. § 278.02095.
139. Mar. 24 Hearing on S.B. 323, supra note 125, at 2–4 (statement of Sen. Amodei,
Guest Legislator).
140. Id. at 3–4.
141. Id.at 3.
142. Id. at 4.
143. Who We Are, MANUFACTURED HOUSING INST., https://www.manufacturedhousing.org/
who-we-are/ [https://perma.cc/6ZBT-RNZT].
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Association not only testified in favor of the bill but also, at Senator
Amodei’s invitation, presented the details of the bill to the
committee.144
In addition, Amodei argued that the bill would enable consumer
choice.145 A few minutes later, a lobbyist for the Nevada
Manufactured Housing Association echoed this free market argument
in favor of the bill. He argued that because of zoning restrictions,
owners of manufactured homes are locked into renting space at
mobile home parks and have no realistic opportunity to move their
homes to a more affordable lot, because local regulations prohibit it.
If instead they “were permitted to move their home to a single-family
residential lot, and many would like this option, a level of competition
would be added to the mobile home park lot rents.”146 Testifying in
favor of the bill, Karl Braun, President of the Nevada Association of
Manufactured Homeowners, repeated this point. The rent he paid for
the land under his home continued to steadily increase. He hoped
that this bill would enable him to move his home to land he owned.147
Amodei also argued that the fact that the state authorizes local
governments to regulate land use “means that the state has always
been in the planning and zoning business.”148 This is a line of
reasoning—that the police power originates with the state which then
delegates it to local governments—heard often in law school
classrooms and not much anywhere else. Once local authority to
regulate land use is a commonly accepted background principle, it is
very hard to dislodge it, even where the law is, on its face, quite clear
that ultimate authority to exercise the police power rests with the
state.

144. Mar. 24 Hearing on S.B. 323, supra note 125, at 5 (statement of Charles W. Joerg,
Lobbyist, Nevada Manufactured Housing Association).
145. Id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Amodei, Guest Legislator) (“In a statewide sense, in
rural areas and urban areas, this is an option that ought to be available in a redevelopment
sense, in an affordable housing sense and in a choice sense for our constituents.”). This
narrative choice is consistent with that made by proponents of similar bills in other states.
In Washington, for example, the bill was titled, “An act relating to prohibiting
discrimination against consumers’ choices in housing.” H.B. REP. ON S.B. 6593, 2004 Leg.,
58th Sess., at 1 (Wash. 2004), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2003-04/Pdf/Bill%
20Reports/House/6593.HBR.pdf. [https://perma.cc/HJ35-F2S5].
146. Mar. 24 Hearing on S.B. 323, supra note 125, at 5 (statement of Charles W. Joerg,
Lobbyist, Nevada Manufactured Housing Association).
147. Id. at 19–20 (statement of Karl Braun, President, Nevada Association of
Manufactured Homeowners).
148. Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Amodei, Guest Legislator).
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Opposing the bill, municipal officials argued that the bill
undermined local control, threatened property values, was
unnecessary to correct market failures, and threatened local jobs.149
The first two arguments are unsurprising.150 As described above, they
are commonly made by advocates of local control of land use. Robert
F. Joiner, a planner for Carson City, Nevada, submitted a letter
making the typical argument: “This is a local planning issue which
should be left to each local government to decide with their respective
residents. . . . [W]e respectfully request that you maintain our ability
to decide within our community where to allow mobile homes.”151
The final two arguments are less intuitive. Because manufactured
housing can be constructed off-site, including out of state, to the
extent that it displaces site-built housing, it may also displace local
jobs.152 The Planning and Economic Development Manager of
Douglas County testified that he had “concerns for Nevada jobs.
Testimony had been heard from manufacturers in California. [The
bill] would take away jobs from the construction industry; that is to
say, Nevada residents, Douglas County residents, Carson City
residents and Las Vegas residents.”153 In fact, the Builders
Association of Western Nevada, the Builders Association of
Northern Nevada, and individual home builders actively opposed the
bill.154 Speaking on behalf of the Builders Association of Western
Nevada, Gayle Farley argued that the bill would undermine
“economic[] diversification . . . because manufactured homes were not
developed in Nevada. [It] would have an adverse effect on
149. Id. at 20–24 (statements of Lesa M. Coder, Lobbyist, Clark County, and Robert F.
Joiner, Lobbyist, Nevada Chapter of American Association).
150. See, e.g., H.B. REP. ON S.B. 6593, 2004 Leg., 58th Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2004),
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2003-04/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/6593.HBR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HJ35-F2S5] (describing two arguments against deregulatory intervention
in favor of manufactured housing: first, “[a]ll cities allow for the siting of manufactured
homes somewhere within the community,” thus rendering the intervention unnecessary;
and second, it protects “local control”). These arguments are consistent with those made
in other states.
151. Letter from Robert F. Joiner, Am. Inst. of Certified Planners, to Sen. Ann
O’Connor, Chair, S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs on behalf of Carson City and the Nev.
Chapter of the Am. Planning Ass’n (Mar. 24, 1999) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
152. Mar. 24 Hearing on S.B. 323, supra note 125, at 26 (statement of John T. Doughty,
Planning and Economic Development Manager, Douglas County).
153. Id.
154. See generally Apr. 29, 1999, Hearing on S.B. 323 Before the Assemb. Comm. on
Gov’t Affairs, 1999 Leg., 70th Sess. (Nev. 1999) [hereinafter Apr. 29 Hearing on S.B. 323]
(summarizing various entities’ opposition to the bill).
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homebuilders, suppliers, electricians, and many other professional
trades in the area.”155 Legislators in other states heard similar
testimony regarding business interests, i.e. whether manufactured
homes were built in or out of state.156
Local and state legislators face different incentives in this regard.
On the local level, deregulation is a losing proposition. Existing
homeowners fear decreased property values.157 In the eyes of existing
homeowners, decreased housing costs are an unqualified evil. And
the cost savings do not accrue locally. Local workers fear losing jobs
to out-of-state manufactured housing factories. The people likely to
benefit from reduced housing costs reside out of town, perhaps even
out of state.158 To state legislators, the cost-benefit analysis is not
quite so clear. Decreased housing costs yield savings that accrue to
low- and moderate-income homeowners, even if deregulation
simultaneously results in decreased property values for existing
homeowners.
State legislators are also more likely to take account of federal
developments, including federal regulations and funding
environments. As a result, interventions in local zoning take place
against the backdrop of federal intervention. Generally, building
codes are adopted by states and local governments. In an effort to
improve the structural conditions of manufactured homes, in the
155. Id. at 25 (statement of Gayle Farley, Executive Officer, Builders Association of
Western Nevada).
156. See, e.g., H.B. REP. ON S.B. 6593, 2004 Leg., 58th Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2004),
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2003-04/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/6593.HBR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HJ35-F2S5] (“There are three companies in this state that build them,
though most come from companies in Oregon.”); Mar. 2, 1993, Hearing on LB 511 Before
the Comm. on Urban Affairs, 1993 Leg., Reg. Sess. 98 (Neb. 1993) [hereinafter Mar. 2
Hearing on LB 511] (statement of Don Hansen) (testifying that 3000 manufactured homes
were constructed in Nebraska the previous year but that 90% of those homes were sold
out of state).
157. For example, a Nevada association of realtors submitted written testimony
arguing that the bill would upset the settled expectations of property owners, many of
whom “had resided in their homes for many years and were counting on the appreciation
of the home as a retirement nest egg. There was always a possibility that placement of a
manufactured home in an existing neighborhood might jeopardize that investment.” Apr.
29 Hearing on S.B. 323, supra note 154, at 15–16 (statement of Deborah Uhart, Past
President, Carson-Douglas-Fallon-Lyon-Tahoe Board of Realtors).
158. Indeed, in Nebraska, legislators heard testimony that the ability to construct
manufactured housing affected people’s decisions where to live. “Kansas has the law, and
people are moving across from Missouri because they can find an affordable home.” Mar.
2 Hearing on LB 511, supra note 156, at 100 (statement of Frank Bellizio) (“It’s increasing
those communities’ tax bases, income taxes for the state, and other sales taxes that are run
up by people living in the community.”).
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1970s the federal government adopted a code applicable to
manufactured housing.159 It is commonly referred to as the “HUD
Code” because it is promulgated by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development.160
The HUD Code, however, does not preempt local land use
regulations. “The general rule is that local zoning regulations are not
subject to the preemptive language of the [HUD Code] because landuse issues are not governed by the HUD Code. The use, density, and
bulk restrictions of local zoning are not ‘aspects of performance’
regulated by the HUD Code.”161 Courts have concluded that “under
federal law, [zoning] ordinances that discriminate against mobile
homes will be upheld unless the ordinances are based on construction
or safety standards which are contained in the federal act.”162
Localities cannot pass construction standards affecting manufactured
housing, but traditional zoning regulations are permitted.163
Despite its lack of federal preemptive effect on local zoning
matters, the HUD Code is regularly cited by industry lobbyists
arguing for state preemption of local zoning. In Nevada, lobbyists
argued that the HUD Code assuaged any reasonable local concerns
159. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat.
633, 700 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401–5426 (2012)).
160. According to the National Consumer Law Center, “the HUD code sets standards
for heating, plumbing, ventilation, air conditioning and electrical systems, design,
construction, transportation, energy efficiency, wind resistance and fire safety.” NAT’L
CONSUMER
LAW
CTR.,
MANUFACTURED
HOUSING
RESOURCE
GUIDE:
WEATHERIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF HOMES 2 (2010), https://www.nclc.org/images/
pdf/manufactured_housing/accessing-public-resources.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQY2-BEL3]. “It
does not guarantee quality in manufactured homes, and there have been problems with
inspection or enforcement, but the quality of newer HUD code homes is generally much
better than that of older ‘pre- ‘76’ mobile homes.” Id. For example, the HUD Code did
away with the usage of 2x2’s rather than 2x4’s in manufactured housing. Id.
161. White, supra note 132, at 267–69.
162. Sanford A. Minkoff & Melanie N. Marsh, State and Federal Preemption in the
Mobile Home Arena: What Can Local Governments Truly Regulate?, 77 FLA. B.J. 42, 44
(2003).
163. Local zoning that limited “trailer coaches” to trailer parks was challenged on the
basis that it was in conflict with federal law regulating the manufacture of mobile homes in
Texas Manufactured Housing Ass’n v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1095 (5th Cir.
1996). When A. J. Waller sought to place a mobile home on his lot, he was denied a permit
since his lot was not within a designated park. Id. at 1098. The fact that his home had been
manufactured pursuant to regulations of the federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development formed the basis of the complaint. Id. Federal law prohibits state or local
government from applying safety standards that differ from federal standards. Id. at 1099.
The Fifth Circuit, however, found that the zoning at issue had the purpose of preserving
property values and was not a safety law barred by federal law. Id. at 1100. Thus, the
preemption argument failed. Id. at 1100–01.
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regarding safety. The HUD Code’s applicability provided some
comfort to state legislators that a deregulatory intervention would not
leave the industry entirely unregulated.
The HUD Code did not, however, convince state legislators that
all local input ought to be preempted. While Nevada stripped local
ability to prohibit or segregate manufactured housing, it permitted
localities limited authority to regulate certain enumerated aesthetic
elements. Local governments may require, for example, that a
manufactured home “[h]ave exterior siding and roofing which is
similar in color, material and appearance to the exterior siding and
roofing primarily used on other single-family residential dwellings in
the immediate vicinity of the manufactured home.”164 As we have
already seen with Michigan’s family day care statute, and as we will
see with California and Maine’s alternative energy interventions and
various states’ group home interventions, Nevada adopted tailoring
requirements for land use regulation in the case of manufactured
housing. It stripped local government of its most powerful tool, a
straight prohibition on an undesirable land use. At the same time, it
allowed local government the power to address those limited
concerns that the state considered to be legitimate.
C.

Small-Scale Residential Alternative Energy Infrastructure165

The alternative energy case study echoes both of the previous
case studies. In this case, state interventions are driven both by states’
own bureaucratic interests and industry lobbyists, who find a more
welcoming seat in state capitols than they do in city halls.
As is the case with family day care homes and group homes, local
prohibitions on alternative energy infrastructure166 can frustrate state

164. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.02095(2)(a)(3) (Westlaw through 79th Reg. Sess.).
Other provisions of the statute permit local governments to require that manufactured
housing “be permanently affixed to a residential lot” and that it “[c]onsist of at least 1,200
square feet of living area.” Id. § 278.02095(2)(a)(1), (5).
165. I focus on small-scale infrastructure rather than, for example, wind farms, which
are more analogous to the power plants, cell phone towers, and other utility infrastructure
already protected by state preemption of local zoning laws. See Jesse Heibel & Jocelyn
Durkay, State Legislative Approaches to Wind Energy Facility Siting, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/state-wind-energysiting.aspx [https://perma.cc/R6YW-3JPG].
166. Alternative energy infrastructure is a broad term that includes a range of
technologies from solar panels and wind turbines to clotheslines. Local zoning affects all
three. State interventions protecting small-scale infrastructure vary, but most focus on
solar panels.
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policy goals.167 Twenty-nine states have established renewable
portfolio standards, statewide policies, and quantitative goals with
respect to the use of alternative energy sources.168 An additional eight
states have established voluntary renewable energy objectives.169 Of
the twenty-nine states170 that restrict local authority to zone various
types, both large- and small-scale, of alternative energy infrastructure,
twenty-two171 have quantitative goals that they are seeking to achieve
by a date certain.172
California, one of the first states to restrict local ability to
regulate solar panels, provides a useful case study of a state
influenced by an organized and powerful lobbying group that found
itself disadvantaged in local politics. Unlike family day care homes
and group homes but like manufactured housing, solar panels are
represented by an active lobby including established environmental
groups and industry associations consisting of both manufacturers and
installers. The solar industry does not have standing to litigate zoning
regulations in municipalities in which it does not own property. Like
167. See Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use
Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 235 (2008) (arguing that “the states must
take back at least some of their powers to regulate land use and facilitate green building as
a solution to the significant extralocal negative externalities of conventional
construction”).
168. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD POLICIES (2016),
http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Renewable-PortfolioStandards.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL27-CLS9].
169. Jocelyn Durkay, State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (July 7, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfoliostandards.aspx [https://perma.cc/552J-MAT2].
170. See ENVTL. LAW INST., STATE ENABLING LEGISLATION FOR COMMERCIALSCALE WIND POWER SITING AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ROLE 18–19 tbl.2 (May
2011), http://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/d21-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/A87Y4PEC] (illustrating which states restrict local zoning authority with respect to wind
turbines); see also Troy A. Rule, Renewable Energy and the Neighbors, 2010 UTAH L.
REV. 1223, 1249–50 (highlighting states that restrict local zoning authority with respect to
solar energy). Between those two sources the states that restrict local zoning authority
include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
171. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin. See
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 168.
172. Id. For example, Oregon has set a target of incorporating twenty-five percent
renewable energy sources into its energy production portfolio by 2025. Durkay, supra note
169.
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the manufactured housing industry, it must rely on each consumer to
resolve expensive, time-consuming land use challenges as they arise
with respect to his or her property. It is not surprising, then, that in
California, the California Solar Energy Industries Association
(“CALSEIA”), now known as the California Solar and Storage
Association, led the 2004 fight to adopt state legislation strengthening
the prohibition on local zoning of solar energy systems.173 According
to its website, CALSEIA’s members include financiers, consultants,
manufacturers, installers, contractors and others.174 CALSEIA
commissioned a report documenting the “serious obstacles in the way
of solar power system installation” imposed by California localities.175
The Clean Power Campaign, the Planning and Conservation League,
the Sierra Club,176 the East Bay Municipal Utility District, and the
League of Women Voters also lobbied in favor of the bill.177
Not every intervention in favor of alternative energy is backed by
an industry lobby. In service of energy conservation, nineteen states
prohibit local governments from outlawing clotheslines.178 In Maine,
sponsoring legislators fought the culture of local land use control with
that of New England penny-pinching.179 Portland resident Bryan
Wentzell testified that local zoning and homeowner association
restrictions on clotheslines “run counter to the Maine Yankee ethos
of saving money in the easiest and simplest of ways.”180
Representative Jon Hinck, who sponsored the legislation, testified,

173. See CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON LOCAL GOV’T, BILL ANALYSIS: AB 2473, at 4
(2004); Cal. Senate Local Gov’t Comm., Bill Analysis: AB 2473, at 1 (2004) (“Industry
advocates say that over the last 25 years, local officials and homeowners’ associations have
increased their requirements, making it harder to install solar energy systems.”).
174. Our Members, CAL. SOLAR & STORAGE ASS’N, http://calseia.org/our-members/
[https://perma.cc/MLU7-PKXJ].
175. CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON LOCAL GOV’T, supra note 173, at 2.
176. See id. at 4.
177. CAL. SENATE RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS: AB 2473, at 4 (2004).
178. Martha Neil, 19 ‘Right to Dry’ States Outlaw Clothesline Bans; Is Yours Among
Them?, ABA J. (Aug. 14, 2013, 8:24 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/20_
right_to_dry_states_outlaw_clothesline_bans_is_yours_among_them [https://perma.cc/Y696DTQX] (“States that already have such bans include Arizona, California, Colorado,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, Virginia and Wisconsin, the
Seattle Times reports.”).
179. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 1421–1424 (Westlaw through 2d Spec. Sess. of
128th Leg.).
180. Testimony of Bryan Wentzell on L.D. 73 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Utils. &
Energy, 2009 Leg., 124th Sess. 3 (Me. 2009) (statement of Bryan Wentzell, Volunteer
Board Member, Project Laundry List).
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quoting an op-ed in the Providence Journal, “[f]orbidding sheets and
undershirts to flap in the New England sunshine is akin to banning
boiled lobsters or requiring New Hampshire town clerks to smile.”181
The bill in question sought to protect the right to erect both
clotheslines and solar panels.182 The latter proved more controversial.
In Maine, unlike California, no industry association,
manufacturer, or installer of solar panels testified in favor of the
bill.183 Just four proponents, including the bill’s sponsor, testified in its
favor.184 None represented the solar industry.185 Six opponents
testified against the bill.186 All of the opponents represented
organized lobbies, including the Maine Real Estate & Development
Association, the Maine Realtors, and the Maine Apartment Owners
and Business Association.187 Both the Maine Municipal Association
and the Maine Association of Planners expressed concern that the bill
would interfere with local ability to address issues of local concern.188
In response to local officials’ objections, the sponsoring
legislators agreed to revise the bill to clarify that local governments
and homeowners’ associations could adopt “reasonable restrictions”
in service of public safety and protection of “historic or aesthetic
values” so long as such restrictions did not increase the cost of solar
installation by more than ten percent or “inhibit the solar energy
device from operating at its intended maximum efficiency.”189 The
final text, as codified, permitted local governments to enact any
reasonable restriction, defined as “any restriction that is necessary to
protect: A. Public health and safety . . . B. Buildings from damage; C.
Historic or aesthetic values, when an alternative of reasonably
comparable cost and convenience is available; or D. Shorelands under
181. Testimony of Jon Hinck on L.D. 73 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Utils. &
Energy, 2009 Leg., 124th Sess. 3 (Me. 2009) (quoting Froma Harrop, Opinion, The ‘Right
to Dry’ Versus Starbuckization, PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 19, 1999, at B-07).
182. L.D. 73, 2009 Leg., 124th Sess. (Me. 2009).
183. See Jan. 27, 2009, Hearing on L.D. 73 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Utils. &
Energy, 2009 Leg., 124th Sess. (Me. 2009) (testimony sign in sheet).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Testimony of the Maine Municipal Association on L.D. 73 Before the J.
Standing Comm. on Utils. & Energy, 2009 Leg., 124th Sess. 1 (Me. 2009); Testimony of the
Maine Association of Planners on L.D. 73 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Utils. &
Energy, 2009 Leg., 124th Sess. 1 (Me. 2009).
189. Feb. 19, 2009, Hearing on L.D. 73 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Utils. &
Energy, 2009 Leg., 124th Sess. 2 (Me. 2009).
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shoreland zoning provisions.”190 The final statute does not define
restrictiveness with reference either to increased cost of installation or
the effect of the regulations on efficiency.191 The final statute
acknowledges that local governments may have some interest in the
manner in which solar infrastructure is installed.192 Simultaneously,
however, the statute refuses to allow local governments to address
that interest by enacting outright bans on solar and other small-scale
alternative energy infrastructure.193
Again, a deregulatory intervention embraces a tailoring
requirement, stripping local government of the ability to overregulate
but allowing limited local authority to render local land uses less
noxious to local regulators. As in the case of family day care homes
and manufactured housing, in the case of small-scale alternative
energy infrastructure, states recognize local propensity to
overregulate while allowing a limited sphere of influence for local
regulators to address truly local impacts of particular land uses.
D. Group Homes
Over a twenty-five-year period, beginning around 1970, over
forty states enacted measures to protect group homes from local
zoning prohibitions.194 Others have argued whether such measures
190. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1423(4) (Westlaw through 2d Spec. Sess. of 128th
Leg.).
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. See id. § 1423(2).
194. Daniel Lauber, A Real Lulu: Zoning for Group Homes and Halfway Houses
Under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 369, 369
(1996). As is the case with family day cares, see supra Section II.A, these zoning laws have
been interpreted to limit nonzoning prohibitions on group homes in residential
communities.
In addition to preempting local zoning ordinances, many state statutes also limit or
void private restrictions in deeds, land contracts, or leases that would exclude
group homes from residential properties or subdivisions. In New York, for
example, a state law known as the Padavan Law specifically preempts local zoning
laws by permitting small group homes in all residential areas, provided certain
procedures are followed regarding the selection of the site. The New York Court
of Appeals rejected an attempt to circumvent this law in Crane Neck Ass’n v.
N.Y.C./Long Island County Services Group. In Crane Neck, a neighborhood
association sought to enforce a restrictive covenant, adopted in 1945, limiting the
use of property within its boundaries to ‘single family dwellings’ to exclude a
group home for eight adults with severe mental retardation. Although the group
home violated the restrictive covenant, the court refused to enforce the covenant
because ‘to do so would contravene a long-standing public policy favoring the
establishment of such residences for the mentally disabled.’ Thus, the court held
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were necessary or appropriate as a normative matter.195 I will focus on
a few states in order to tell their stories, as I have in previous sections,
to illuminate the relationship between state and local governments.
The national movement in favor of moving mentally disabled
people from large institutions to small community-based facilities
began in the 1960s when the American Psychiatric Association
collected data and commissioned studies supporting “normalization”
and the benefits to patients’ health that resulted from
deinstitutionalization.196 In the 1970s, advocates initiated a litigation
strategy, arguing that large state-run institutions failed to meet their
patients’ needs and, in some cases, abused their patients.197
Simultaneously, advocates mobilized at the federal level to advance
legislation intended to enable developmentally disabled people to live
in subsidized community-based facilities.198
The federal government responded. In the Developmental
Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, the federal
government both required that developmentally disabled people be
treated “in the setting that is least restrictive of the person’s personal
liberty”199 and mandated statewide protection and advocacy programs
intended to ensure that people with developmental disabilities not be
subject to abuse and neglect.200 In addition, the federal government

that although it explicitly addresses only local laws and ordinances, the Padavan
Law also preempts restrictive covenants.
Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One’s Own: The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and
Housing Discrimination Against People with Mental Disabilities, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 925,
978 (1994) (quoting Crane Neck Ass’n v. N.Y.C./Long Island Cty. Servs. Grp., 460 N.E.2d
1336, 1337, 1339 (N.Y. 1984)).
195. See, e.g., Robert J. Hopperton, A State Legislative Strategy for Ending
Exclusionary Zoning of Community Homes, 19 URB. L. ANN. 47, 60–61 (1980). More
recently, some have argued that the amendments to the Fair Housing Act rendered such
interventions unnecessary (and may have rendered certain compromises embedded in
those interventions unlawful). Because they are not relevant to this discussion, I ignore
these debates here.
196. See, e.g., Kanter, supra note 194, at 926.
197. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization
Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 14 (2012).
198. See, e.g., Hopperton, supra note 195, at 47. While this advocacy is commonly
referred to as the deinstitutionalization movement, according to a 1982 study,
approximately thirty-two percent of group home residents had never lived in large
institutions but, instead, had resided with family.
199. Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103,
§ 201, 89 Stat. 502, 502–03 (1975), repealed by Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).
200. Id.
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began reimbursing states for expenditures incurred in the
development and operation of community-based homes.201
As they responded to federal incentives and court-ordered
mandates, states found that local zoning codes often forced group
homes into less than ideal locations. Deinstitutionalization advocates
touted the benefits of placing developmentally disabled people in
residential neighborhoods, where they could become part of an
existing community.202 Instead, local zoning codes forced group
homes into industrial and commercial areas or concentrated them in
low-income urban areas lacking the political clout to object.203 By
1977, the problem was sufficiently well understood that the American
Bar Association published model state legislation stripping local
zoning authority over group homes.204
Having overcome barriers to deinstitutionalization at the federal
and state levels, advocates and state agencies began to focus on local
zoning. Instead of seeking to revise thousands of towns’ zoning codes,
advocates focused on the states. In some states, displacing or
clawback zoning statutes were introduced as part of a package of bills
intended to assist developmentally disabled people.205 In these states,
the zoning provision tended to attract less attention and opposition as
it hid among a plethora of provisions restructuring administrative
agencies and allocating funding to social services.206
201. See NEV. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, BULLETIN NO. 83-1: STUDY OF THE
PROBLEMS AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY RETARDED ADULTS 4 (1982); K. Charlie
Lakin & Margaret Jean Hall, Medicaid-Financed Residential Care for Persons with Mental
Retardation, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., 1990 supp., at 149, 150.
202. See Hopperton, supra note 195, at 50.
203. See id. at 52–53.
204. See American Bar Ass’n, Zoning for Community Homes Serving Developmentally
Disabled Persons, 20 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 794, 804, 806–10 (1977).
205. See, e.g., Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 637, 1986 Md. Laws 2288 (codified at MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 7-101-802 (LEXIS through 2018 Reg. Sess.)) (“This bill completely
rewrites the ‘Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Law.’”); Act of Mar. 19,
1983, ch. 61, § 1, 1983 Nev. Stat. 220, 220–21; Act of May 1, 1981, ch. 154, 1981 Nev. Stat.
321; Act of July 6, 1978, ch. 468, § 1, 1978 N.Y. Laws 1, 1–3 (codified as N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 41.34 (McKinney 2018)).
206. Similarly, many deregulatory interventions in favor of family child care were just
one component of a package of policies intended to bolster family day cares. CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 8-2, -3e, -3f, -3j (Westlaw through 2018 Feb. Reg. Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 2616 (Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of 105th Leg.) (resulting in no testimony on
the zoning provision itself); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 35.63.185, 36.70.757 (Westlaw
through 2018 Reg. Sess.); see also William J. Booher, Child-Related Bills Keep Legislators
Busy on Last Day, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 30, 1993, at E3 (introducing training
requirements for child care employees and increasing the maximum number of children
certain centers could care for among other components of the legislation).
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Again, state bureaucrats proved an unlikely ally in a
deregulatory project. State social services agencies endorsed
removing local regulations limiting siting of group homes. In
Michigan, for example, the Department of Social Services was first on
the list of groups that supported the bill.207
State bureaucrats argued that local zoning undermined their
charge to effectively and cost-efficiently care for developmentally
disabled and mentally ill people. Michigan advocates of state
intervention argued that local governments used zoning to “exclude
[group homes] from those residential areas where they could be most
effective” resulting in clusters of group homes in the commercial and
industrial zones where towns tolerated them.208 Thus, “[t]he intent of
community based care is subverted because neither the neighborhood
nor the home itself provides a ‘normal’ living situation.”209 Bill
proponents argued that the state ought to intervene in order to
prevent local regulation from subverting state policy in favor of
deinstitutionalization and community-based care.210 In Maine,
legislators heard testimony that “[t]he Commissioner of Mental
Health, and Retardation, Commissioner Concannon, feels that the
most important piece of legislation that this legislature will be
confronting this year, is this Bill that deals directly with group
homes.”211 Maine, like many other states, operated under a consent
decree and existing laws requiring the state bureaucracy to place
people in community-based facilities, which were sometimes
hampered by operation of local zoning law.212 In Nevada, a
representative of the state’s Division of Mental Hygiene and Mental
Retardation testified to the decreased costs of housing people in
community-based group homes as compared to large institutions.213
207. MICH. HOUSE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS SECTION, BILL ANALYSIS: H.B. 4896, at 3
(1976).
208. Id. at 1. Prior to state interventions, clusters of facilities were found in urban areas
across the country. For example, in 1979 the Los Angeles Times reported that most
facilities were “clustered in old downtown sections” and “commercial zones,” resulting in
“impacting certain areas least able to cope with the facilities and their residents.” Sam
Kaplan, Community Care Versus Zoning: A Legal Conflict, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1979, at
E1.
209. MICH. HOUSE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS SECTION, supra note 207, at 1.
210. Id.
211. 110 LEGIS. REC., 110th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., at 478 (Me. 1982) (testimony of Sen.
Conley).
212. H.P. 2067, 110th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 1982).
213. Mar. 25, 1981, Hearing on S.B. 268 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs,
1981 Leg., 61st Sess. 1192 (Nev. 1981) [hereinafter Mar. 25 Hearing on S.B. 268]
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As with family day cares and manufactured housing, states
deregulated group homes by requiring towns to treat them as
residential uses. Arizona’s deregulatory intervention in favor of group
homes, for example, provides that “[u]nrelated persons living
together notwithstanding, a residential facility which serves six or
fewer persons shall be considered a residential use of property for the
purposes of all local zoning ordinances if such facility provides care
on a twenty-four hour per day basis.”214 Not only must local
governments treat group homes as residential uses, they must treat
them as they do the most privileged of residential uses, the singlefamily home: “For the purposes of all local ordinances, a residential
facility which serves six or fewer persons shall not be included within
the definition of any term which implies that the residential facility
differs in any way from a single family residence.”215 Because singlefamily homes are typically permitted in all residential neighborhoods
and many commercial zones, the effect is to deregulate group
homes.216 A small number of states took a similar approach but
treated single-family districts more gingerly than they did multifamily
districts. In Utah, for example, single-family districts must permit
group homes by conditional permit, but multifamily districts must
permit them as of right.217
While state agencies supported zoning interventions,
municipalities and local governments opposed them. In Michigan, for
example, the Michigan Municipal League, Michigan Townships
Association, and seventeen towns opposed the bill. No locality or
advocate for localities endorsed the bill. Having convinced federal
and state officials of the importance and urgency of their cause,
advocates failed, or did not try, to woo local politicians.
In various states, the floor debate evidenced state legislators’
difficulty embracing a state-level solution to a land use problem. A
state senator responded to a lobbyist for the Nebraska Association
for Retarded Citizens that the state was the wrong forum for
resolving concerns about discriminatory land use regulation, because

(statement of Jack Middleton) (“It is much cheaper as you can see to go the group home
care method, and it is allowing mentally retarded individuals to live in a homelike
setting.”).
214. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-582(A) (Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. of 2018).
215. Id. at § 36-582(B).
216. Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., The Twilight of Single-Family Zoning, 3 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 161, 206–07 (1983).
217. Act of Mar. 3, 1981, ch. 51, 1981 Utah Laws 326 (repealed 1997).
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“[t]hat looks to me like it’s a zoning problem here.” When the
lobbyist responded, “[t]hat’s why I think it’s necessary that there be a
state zoning law,” the senator expressed confusion, failing to
understand why it was necessary to “impose it up on the whole state if
you have problems with [a local law.]”218 The senator could not
fathom a role for the state in zoning.
Similarly, while intervention advocates framed the issue as one of
liberty from burdensome local regulation, some state legislators
resisted casting local laws as regulations at all. Intervention
supporters cited, among other things, the layers of bureaucracy to
which group homes were already subject.219 In Nevada, bill sponsors
embraced the deregulatory nature of the project and framed the issue
as one of liberty: “This will encourage the development of
community-based care for the mentally retarded persons to live in an
environment that is less restrictive of their personal liberty.”220 But
some legislators remained unconvinced that state interventions could
be deregulatory in nature. A Nebraska state senator referred to state
law as a “mandate,” while ignoring the fact that local laws, like state
laws, exert control and impose mandates. In effect, he conflated
“local” with “deregulatory” while also conflating “state law” and
“mandate.”221 In later testimony, a local director of planning
supported this stance, arguing that “[l]ocal control is basically at issue
here. I believe most people would agree that we have enough federal
and state directives without adding additional ones dealing inside
local zoning ordinances.”222 Proponents and opponents of Nebraska’s
bill agreed that there were, to put it colloquially, “too many
regulations.” But the opponents failed to see the local laws as
regulations.
Similarly, in Maine, bill opponents objected to an effort “to in
some way override local community zoning ordinances.”223 One state
senator objected to the state bureaucracy “asking this Legislature to
say to local communities that . . . we know better than the local
218. Feb. 26, 1979 Hearing on L.B. 525 Before the Pub. Health & Welfare Comm., 86th
Leg., 1st Sess. 37 (Neb. 1979) [hereinafter Feb. 26 Hearing on L.B. 525] (statements of
Sen. Clark and Ms. Everett).
219. For example, in support of Nebraska’s law, a representative of a nonprofit
community-based services provider described the plethora of fees and public hearings to
which group homes were subject. Id. at 41–42 (statement of Chuck Martens).
220. NEV. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, supra note 201, at 6.
221. Feb. 26 Hearing on L.B. 525, supra note 218, at 44 (statement of Sen. Clark).
222. Id. at 48–49 (statement of Nelson Helm).
223. 110 LEGIS. REC., 110th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., at 478 (Me. 1982).
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communities.”224 Later, another senator expressed “regret” that bill
supporters “ha[d] so little confidence in the people of the State of
Maine, acting in their own communities.”225 Bill opponents described
the law as a restriction on “people” rather than on local government
and concluded that the vote would come down to “whether we, as
representatives of the people, have enough confidence in those
people that we will let them act in their own communities with their
own common sense and their own compassion.”226
As in Nebraska and Maine, in Ohio, the primary opponent was
local government, as represented by the Ohio Municipal League. Its
executive director argued that “[i]t goes without saying that the
League position is that policy questions relating to the zoning of
community-based residence facilities for the mentally retarded are
matters for local decision-making processes.”227 Municipal leagues and
other consortia of local interests are themselves a special interest,228
but they did not hesitate to decry group home advocates as special
interests and state interventions on behalf of group homes as “an
erosion of local zoning control . . . that could set a precedent for other
special interest groups to make similar requests of the legislature in
the future.”229
Bureaucrats and other advocates responded by interrogating
local concerns. They cited studies, for example, that found that group
homes did not decrease nearby property values, a primary concern
raised by local opponents of group homes.230 This fact—that studies
224. Id.
225. Id. at 480 (testimony of Sen. Collins).
226. Id.
227. See Hopperton, supra note 195, at 60.
228. Rodriguez, supra note 110, at 673.
229. Feb. 27, 1981, Hearing on S.B. 268 Before the S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 1981
Leg., 61st Sess., ex. E, at 197 (Nev. 1981) (written testimony of Leann McElroy, Principal
Planner, City of Reno).
230. Id. ex. C, at 195 (testimony of Jack Middleton, Administrative Coordinator for the
Division of Mental Hygiene and Mental Retardation). These studies echo contemporary
efforts to determine whether affordable housing decreases nearby property values. The
general consensus is that it does not. See, e.g., CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY, “DON’T PUT IT
HERE!”: DOES AFFORDABLE HOUSING CAUSE PROPERTY VALUES TO DECLINE
NEARBY? 1 http://furmancenter.org/files/media/Dont_Put_It_Here.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M648-VF8U]. Nevertheless, local governments routinely act on the assumption that it
does. See Sheldon S. Shafer, Redesign Prospect Cove, Planners Order, COURIERJOURNAL (Feb. 1, 2017, 11:06AM), http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2017/
02/01/redesign-prospect-cove-planners-order/97332216/ [https://perma.cc/7HB2-U9T5]
(reporting homeowners’ concerns over affordable housing bringing more crime and
decreasing property values in a Louisville, Kentucky, neighborhood).
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demonstrate that group homes do not decrease nearby property
values—was often repeated by legislators in floor debate and hearing
testimony. Property owners advocating for zoning changes and relief
before local regulators rarely have the opportunity to introduce that
kind of evidence. Even when they do, local regulators will routinely
dismiss rigorous empirical studies in favor of “first-hand” accounts
from angry neighbors. In the land use context, states provide a more
neutral arbiter of these kinds of facts and accounts.
Nevertheless, given the debate, it is not surprising that states
acted cautiously. First, state legislators demanded proof of the
underlying problem. For example, North Dakota did not pass its
intervention the first time it was introduced. A number of legislators
who supported the bill that passed in 1983 claimed not to have voted
for it earlier because they had no evidence of local discrimination or
bad actors. By 1983, however, advocates had convinced state
legislators that there was a problem. One of those legislators
described her turning point: “[A] year ago something came up and
people did come in and protest against the group homes, and all the
uglies came out . . . .”231 Conversely, in Ohio, the state exempted
localities “that had in effect on June 15, 1977 an ordinance specifically
permitting licensed residential facilities in residential zones . . . so long
as the ordinance remains in effect without any substantive
modification.”232 In essence, the statute exempted good actors from
the state’s mandate.
Second, some states, including Nevada and New York, initially
passed a pilot statute, scheduled to sunset after some set period of
time.233 In Nevada, the pilot period allowed bill sponsors to evaluate
local concerns. In the words of one bill sponsor seeking to make the
zoning provision permanent:
The central debate in the last session, had to do with what effect
this would have on the neighborhoods in which such groups
[sic] homes had been established. We now have some results as

231. An Act to Redefine “Developmentally Disabled Person” and to Require Residential
Zoning for Group Homes for Developmentally Disabled Persons in Counties, Cities, and
Townships: Hearing on H.B. 1447 Before the S. Political Subdivisions Comm., 1983 Leg.,
48th Sess. 2 (N.D. 1983) (statement of Rep. D. Olsen).
232. OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM’N, SUMMARY OF 1977 ENACTMENTS: JAN.–
OCT., at 128 (Ohio 1977) (summarizing Am. Sub. S. B. 71).
233. Act of July 6, 1978, ch. 468, sec. 2, § 41.34, 1978 N.Y. Laws 1, 1–3 (codified as
amended at N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAWS § 41.34 (McKinney 2018)); Act of May 1, 1981, ch.
154, 1981 Nev. Stat. 321, 321 (expired July 1, 1983).
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to that particular effect, and I am pleased to announce to you
today that I have not yet had one adverse report involving such
things as the proximity of such a group home to any other
residential area.234
Holly Elder, Project Director of the Developmental Disabilities
Advocate’s Office, cited the decreased costs of group homes
compared to large institutions.235 She also described the daily life
tasks, like traveling by bus, developmentally disabled adults learned
in group homes that they could not learn in large institutional
settings.236
Third, some states exempted some local governments or some
resident populations from the statute’s purview. Florida exempted
municipalities that adopted a model zoning provision permitting
group homes.237 It also allowed for some local input on group home
location decisions, so long as local objections were based on a local
overconcentration of group homes.238 In Nebraska, in response to
opposition by municipalities, the sponsors applied the intervention
only to homes for developmentally disabled and handicapped
people.239 As the result of local opposition, group homes for the
mentally ill did not receive the statute’s protections.240 Similarly, in
Virginia, a subcommittee convened for the express purposes of
“study[ing] methods of site selection of community residences for the
mentally disabled, juveniles, substance abusers and others who
require treatment which includes assimilation into the community”241
quickly decided that “the clear intent of [the above-quoted joint

234. Feb. 15, 1983 Hearing on A.B. 34 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs,
1983 Leg., 62d Sess. 1–2 (Nev. 1983) (statement of Assemb. David D. Nicholas).
235. Id. at 5 (statement of Holly Elder, Project Director, Developmental Disabilities
Advocate’s Office).
236. Id.
237. FLA. HOUSE COMM. ON HEALTH & REHAB. SERVS., STAFF ANALYSIS &
ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT: H.B. 1269, at 5 (1989).
238. Id. at 4.
239. Jan. 15, 1980, Hearing on L.B. 525, 87th Leg., 1st Sess. 6006 (Neb. 1980)
(testimony of Sen. Sieck) (“L.B. 525 has been changed quite a bit from the original draft.
We had quite a bit of opposition at the hearings from the municipalities and in working
with the municipalities we have been able to come up with a clean bill which would be
accepted by all individuals.”).
240. Later, partially as a result of that exception, Nebraska repealed the Act because of
fears it violated the Fair Housing Act. See Act of June 6, 1991, L.B. 825, 1991 Neb. Laws
825; Effect of Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 on Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 18–
1744 through 18–1747, Neb. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 90013, 1990 WL 485340, at *1 (1990).
241. S.J. Res. 220, 1989 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1989).
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resolution] was that the study focus primarily upon the siting of group
homes and other residential facilities for the mentally disabled.”242
Finally, as with family day care, residential solar, and
manufactured housing, some of the blunted interventions allow for
limited, tailored local input. Colorado’s intervention permitted local
bulk and aesthetic zoning restrictions on group homes, even as it
prohibited local governments from enacting use regulations that
“would be tantamount to prohibition of such homes from any
residential district.”243 Ultimately, the Ohio Municipal League
secured procedures allowing local elected officials to comment on the
state’s licensure of group homes.244 Lawmakers in New York and
West Virginia made similar concessions to local governments,
incorporating opportunities for local governments to voice concerns
while stripping them of decision-making power in the case of group
homes. Initially, West Virginia allowed districts that permit only
single-family homes or duplexes to continue to exclude group
homes.245 In 1985, West Virginia removed the exemption for singlefamily and duplex neighborhoods, but created a process for neighbors
to complain about specific activity taking place in group homes.246
The most common tailoring in the group home context is
dispersal. Dispersal provisions prohibit similar uses from locating
within some set distance from one another.247 Some zoning codes, for

242. VA. J. SUBCOMM. STUDYING SITE SELECTION OF RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES FOR
MENTALLY DISABLED, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
VIRGINIA, S. DOC. NO. 36, at 1 (1990).
243. COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-23-303(2)(c) (LEXIS through 2018 Legis. Sess.); see also
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.19(N) (LEXIS through SB 221 of 132d Gen. Assemb.)
(permitting bulk and design zoning regulations to continue applying).
244. Hopperton, supra note 195, at 72–73.
245. Act of Mar. 4, 1980, ch. 101, § 27-17-2, 1980 W. Va. Acts 554, 556 (codified at W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 27-17-2 (Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.)).
246. Act of Apr. 13, 1985, ch. 85, § 27-17-2, 1985 W. Va. Acts 1015, 1017 (codified at W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 27-17-2 (Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.)).
247. While some argue that dispersal requirements violate either the United States
Constitution or the federal Fair Housing Act, in particular the 1988 amendments to the
Act, I do not address either of those arguments here. I focus instead on how dispersal
requirements can mollify local governments facing state intervention in local land use
decision making. For an analysis of the fair housing implications of dispersal requirements,
see Daniel R. Mandelker, Housing Quotas for People with Disabilities: Legislating
Exclusion, 43 URB. LAW. 915, 915–16 (2011) (“Housing quotas for persons with
disabilities are a rigid, unacceptable, and illegal means for allocating housing
opportunities. They clearly violate constitutional and statutory rights to free choice in the
distribution of housing opportunity.”).
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example, require liquor stores248 or adult uses249 to be dispersed.
Nebraska’s statute, as a concession to local government opponents,250
required group homes to be at least 1200 feet away from one another
and set a maximum number of group homes per locality as a function
of local population.251 In New Jersey, for example, a dispersal
provision appears in the final version of the group home intervention,
but not in the initial proposed bill.252
Dispersal requirements have three related impacts.253 First, they
limit concentration of a particular use. Dispersal requirements
effectively cap the number of group homes, or other locally
undesirable land uses (“LULUs”),254 in a single town. Dispersal
requirements may mollify local regulators by assuring them that a
displacing intervention will not have a disproportionate impact on any
one town. Daniel Mandelker argues that these effective quotas are
discriminatory as they “allow a municipality to prohibit additional
group homes once the occupants of existing group homes exceed a
specified number or a certain percentage of the population, or when
there is an ‘excessive concentration’ of group homes.”255
Second, they limit the impact, across any one municipality, of a
displacing intervention. State lawmakers may push for dispersal
requirements not in an effort to mollify local lawmakers and
homeowners but instead in an effort to ensure that group homes are
248. See, e.g., NEW HAVEN, CONN., ZONING ORDINANCE art. V, § 42.1(c)(2) (2017)
(“No package permit shall be permitted to locate within 1,500 feet of another package
permit.”).
249. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976) (upholding
Detroit ordinance prohibiting an adult use from locating less than one thousand feet from
another adult use or less than five hundred feet from a residential neighborhood).
250. Effect of Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 on Neb. Rev. Stat.
§§ 18–1744 through 18–1747, Neb. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 90013, 1990 WL 485340, at *2
(1990).
251. Act of Feb. 14, 1980, L.B. 525, § 3, 1980 Neb. Laws 227, 227.
252. See S.B. 210, 1978 Leg., 179th Sess. (N.J. 1978) (as passed by Senate, Nov. 13,
1978).
253. It is worth noting that dispersal is not feasible without state intervention. As
North Dakota’s Governor’s Council on Human Resources argued in a memorandum in
support of that state’s intervention, dispersal requires state action. So long as the vast
majority of localities chose to exclude group homes, those that permitted them risked
becoming “a magnet for large numbers of homes.” An Act to Redefine “Developmentally
Disabled Person” and to Require Residential Zoning for Group Homes for
Developmentally Disabled Persons in Counties, Cities, and Townships: Hearing on H.B.
1447 Before the H. Political Subdivisions Comm., 1983 Leg., 48th Sess. app. D, at 1 (N.D.
1983).
254. See ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 27, at 811–12.
255. Mandelker, supra note 247, at 941 (footnote omitted).
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not concentrated in neighborhoods that were once residential but
become, over time, clusters of group homes. As a 1983 General
Accounting Office (“GAO”) report described, “[m]any mental health
and mental retardation professionals believe that excessive clustering
of special population facilities adversely affects community placement
objectives, particularly by decreasing the opportunities for clients to
associate with persons who are not members of special population
groups and by changing the character of neighborhoods.”256
Third, dispersal rules provide a rough guidepost for
differentiating between inclusive and exclusionary municipalities.
Once a town has permitted (or been forced to accommodate) some
number of group homes, the beneficiaries of those uses are residents
and constituents of the town. And neighbors’ willingness to
accommodate development will be informed by past experience
rather than baseless fears of property devaluation. As a result, once
the quota has been met, the state may be less concerned that that
town is inclined to discriminate against group home residents.
Similarly, Connecticut and Massachusetts exempt towns in which
more than ten percent of housing units are affordable257 from their
Anti-Snob Zoning Acts.258 One argument in favor of the ten percent
rule and dispersal rules is that negative externalities are associated
with high concentrations of LULUs. But another is that states simply
assume that if a town accommodates a number of LULUs, whether
group homes or affordable housing, there is less reason to worry that
the town is acting in an exclusionary manner.
Dispersal provisions are akin to the tailoring provision in
Maine’s alternative energy statute or Nevada’s manufactured housing
law. Responding to local concerns, state lawmakers attempt to
differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate local interests. They
then craft interventions to address or permit local governments to
256. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-204732, AN ANALYSIS OF ZONING AND
OTHER PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GROUP HOMES FOR THE
MENTALLY DISABLED 27 (1983).
257. The term “affordable” is defined differently in each of the three statutes.
Massachusetts defines affordable to mean subsidized by the federal or state government.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 20 (Westlaw through ch. 322 of the 2018 2d Ann. Sess.).
Connecticut includes in its definition all deed-restricted housing, provided the deed
restrictions limit rental rates or resale value as well as residents’ incomes. CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 8-30g (Westlaw through 2018 Feb. Reg. Sess.).
258. These laws provide an appeals process for affordable housing developers who are
denied land use approvals. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-30g to -30i (Westlaw through
2018 Feb. Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20–23 (Westlaw through ch. 322 of
the 2018 2d Ann. Sess.).
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address the legitimate local interests. In the case of group homes, the
legitimate local interest is deconcentration. Concentration of multiple
group homes in a small geographic area might unfairly concentrate
the harms purportedly experienced by neighbors of group homes. In
addition, it is contrary to state policy in favor of integrating disabled
people into residential communities. State statutes acknowledge that
local concern by addressing it in the state statute itself.259 But because
local governments are likely to overreach by prohibiting uses that
ought to be permitted but regulated, states remove that power from
local hands.
These rules allow states to have a significant local impact without
micromanaging local land use decision-making. Again, in the case of
group homes, states embrace tailoring requirements in allocating
zoning authority. States made some concessions to local government
while successfully promoting the establishment of group homes in
residential neighborhoods.
State legislators quickly moved to limit local zoning authority
over group homes. “In 1977, when the first national survey of state
zoning laws was conducted, only five states—California, Colorado,
Minnesota, Montana, and New Jersey—had state statutes preempting
local zoning laws.”260 In less than a decade, that number grew from
five to over twenty-five. In 1986, Peter Salsich noted that “[i]n recent
years, more than half the states have enacted statutes that attempt to
resolve local conflicts over group homes in various ways.”261 By 1994,
one commentator said that “[t]oday most states have statutes that
preempt local zoning ordinances by restricting localities from using
their zoning laws to prevent people with mental disabilities from
living in residential neighborhoods. If this trend continues, virtually
every state will soon have legislation promoting the acceptance of
group homes in local communities.”262
By 1983, a sufficient number of states had adopted interventions
such that the GAO could compare those that had to those that had
259. In fact, some state statutes permit local governments to override the dispersal
requirement, suggesting that dispersal is often a concession to local governments rather
than a policy choice intended to benefit group home residents. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:55D-66.1 (Westlaw through L.2018, c. 140 and J.R. No. 12); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 109a-102, -205 (Westlaw through 2018 2d Spec. Sess.).
260. Kanter, supra note 194, at 975.
261. Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Group Homes, Shelters and Congregate Housing:
Deinstitutionalization Policies and the NIMBY Syndrome, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
413, 424–25 (1986).
262. Kanter, supra note 194, at 975 (footnote omitted).
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not. The GAO’s study compared group home location in states with
zoning interventions and those without. States with preemptive laws
had more group homes in the suburbs.263 “States with preemptive
zoning laws appeared to facilitate the establishment of group homes
for the mentally disabled in residential zones. Where these laws were
passed a significant shift took place in the location of homes from the
urban centers to more residential suburban-type areas.”264 The change
was significant. The GAO found that “a pronounced decrease took
place in the proportion of homes established in urban center areas—
from 29 to 7 percent.”265 These shifts riled residents of those suburban
communities. The report found that, “after the laws were passed,
community opposition increased, especially in suburban areas.”266 In
other words, prior to state zoning interventions, group home
administrators did not attempt to locate in towns likely to oppose
them. After the state zoning interventions, group home
administrators were free to select the best locations, without worrying
about the costs and delays associated with local zoning battles.
III. WHAT MOTIVATES INTERVENTION?
It is worth noting the simple fact that states do intervene to strip
local governments of zoning authority. Scholars have focused on
procedural interventions and double vetoes, or they have focused on
large-scale interventions that occur in a small number of states. But
displacing interventions do occur in diverse and numerous states, and
they tend to occur under certain common circumstances.
Analyzing forty years of legislative history across over forty-two
states allows for some conclusions regarding those common
circumstances. First, counterintuitively, states intervene to protect
groups that are minorities at both the local and state levels. Second,
states intervene to protect the interests of state bureaucracies and
administrative agencies, even when those agencies do not own or
manage property.267 Lastly, states are not blind to local interests. Even
when they strip local governments of the ability to enact outright use
prohibitions, states will permit local governments to regulate discrete
impacts of those uses.
263. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 256, at 18–19 (1983).
264. Id. at 24–25.
265. Id. at 25.
266. Id.
267. States, of course, also exempt their own property development from local land use
regulation. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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A. States Provide a Lobbying Opportunity for Interests that Cannot
Compete with “Homevoters” at the Local Level
States provide a lobbying opportunity for groups that otherwise
have little clout at the local level. For example, while every state
counts manufacturers and employers among its population, many
localities do not. In communities that are entirely residential,
manufacturers and employers may have no clout at all.
On the other hand, manufacturers and employers are highly
persuasive lobbies in state capitols. Manufacturers and employers are
represented in the state population even if they may not be counted
among the population of any one town. One might expect that states
will intervene in local affairs where a group is underrepresented in the
local population relative to its population in the state as a whole.
Consider the recent debates over transgender rights in North
Carolina and Texas. Following the passage of bills protecting
transgender people in Houston and Charlotte, the states of Texas and
North Carolina intervened to preempt those bills. Religious
conservatives exercised their power at the state level to preempt
legislation that they did not have the numbers to defeat at the local
level. The demographic differences between the city of Charlotte and
North Carolina as a whole and between the city of Houston and
Texas as a whole drove the states’ decisions to intervene. This is a
fairly straightforward story.268
This fairly straightforward story, however, does not explain at
least two of the interventions described in this Article. With respect
to group homes and family day care homes, there are two possible
interest groups, providers (i.e., social service agencies, family day care
providers) and users (i.e., mentally disabled people, working
parents).269 With respect to either group, it is unlikely that the state
268. See David A. Graham, North Carolina Overturns LGBT-Discrimination Bans,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/northcarolina-lgbt-discrimination-transgender-bathrooms/475125/ [https://perma.cc/H9LW-YVQ7];
Elizabeth Reiner Platt, States Attempting to Preempt LGBT-Friendly Municipalities,
COLUM. L. SCH.: PUB. RTS., PRIV. CONSCIENCE PROJECT (Feb. 11, 2016),
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/publicrightsprivateconscience/2016/02/11/states-attemptingto-preempt-lgbt-friendly-municipalities/ [https://perma.cc/E7RL-CR55].
269. Day care centers, which compete with family day care homes, are also relevant
interest groups. Interestingly, this project turned up just one instance of a day care center
testifying against liberalizing regulations affecting family day care homes. Hearing on L.B.
1013 Before the S. Comm. on Health & Human Serv., 1988 Leg., 90th Sess. 12–19 (Neb.
1988) (statement of Jerry Erdman, Executive Vice President of West Omaha Child Care
Services, S. Comm. on Health & Human Servs.). Notably, Mr. Erdman testified on a
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population is significantly higher or lower, as a percentage of total
residents, than that of any one locality. At the same time, each group
is dispersed throughout the state and likely to be of some interest to
all state legislators, rather than, for example, only to legislators who
represent rural areas or only to legislators whose districts include
certain natural resources or industry sectors. These groups are able to
exercise power at the state level despite the fact that they do not
constitute a majority of the state’s population. They are a minority at
both the local and state level. This suggests that the issue is not that
they gain power at the state level but that some other opposing lobby
loses power at the state level.
As has been well theorized and documented, homeowners,
dubbed “homevoters” by William Fischel, dominate local land use
politics.270 Because most homeowners concentrate their wealth in a
single asset, their home, they are extremely motivated to oppose any
development that might decrease the value of that asset, even if the
risk is low. Land use scholars and students of real estate development
patterns have long theorized that while homeowners and residents
dominate local policymaking in suburban towns, developers dominate
policymaking in large cities.271 Recent empirical work casts doubt on
the theory that developers control land use policy even in the largest
cities.272
Homevoters effectively control decision-making at the local
level. Because homevoters are numerous, it is difficult for lobbyists to
reach them. And because homevoters are highly and self-interestedly
risk averse, it is difficult for lobbyists to persuade them, even when
those lobbyists are armed with otherwise convincing data and facts.
As one group homes advocate stated the problem in legislative
testimony, “[t]he groups involved in helping the mentally retarded do
not have the money to totally re-educate the public to bring them to

package of bills intended to advance family day care and did not specifically speak to the
provision regarding local zoning. One reason for the infrequency of centers testifying
against these provisions might be the absolute scarcity of day care slots. Centers do not
fear competition because the need is so high. Another might be that centers and family
day care homes do not compete. They may serve different clientele, seeking different price
points, quality measures, and levels of convenience.
270. FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 3.
271. See, e.g., JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 62–75 (1987).
272. Been et al., supra note 3, at 231, 259 (concluding that homevoters “are more
powerful in urban politics” than other stakeholders).
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an awareness of the fact that they have a vast basket of irrational
fears regarding mentally retarded people.”273
But state capitols pose a challenge for homevoters, one that they
may not be able to overcome in the face of organized opposition.
Relative to state bureaucrats, industry lobbyists and even social
service agencies, homevoters have less opportunity to participate in
the state political process. And, without a specific identifiable
development project on the line, they have less reason to do so.274
Homevoter influence drives decisions at the local level in part
because the contested issues are embodied in individual proposed
developments with anticipated negative effects on specific existing
residents. Because localities rarely engage in a wholesale revision of
the zoning ordinance, land use disputes occur around individual
proposed projects.275 These projects are almost always in someone’s
backyard and are highly salient to homevoters. Consider the example
of family day care. A neighbor is likely to take the time to challenge a
nearby family day care before a local land use board. For its part, a
land use board is likely to be swayed by a neighbor’s eyewitness
account of traffic and noise concerns caused by the day care. It is
unlikely to respond to empirical evidence that day care homes do not
generally decrease property values, for instance, in the face of an
angry neighbor insisting that this day care home will.
Local public participation opportunities are intended to be
convenient to homevoters. Lay volunteer boards are appointed to
hear land use applications. Zoning hearings are often scheduled at
night to accommodate volunteer commissioners and the town
residents that might wish to testify on a proposed zoning change or
variance. And, by definition, they occur in the town where a resident
opposing a project lives. Public hearings before state legislatures, on
the other hand, are scheduled to accommodate full-time legislators
and lobbyists. They occur during normal business hours in state
capitols that can be hundreds of miles from where a homeowner lives.
With rare exception, state policymaking, by contrast, is made
without reference to specific projects. The anticipated ill effects of
additional development are not concrete and are therefore
significantly less salient to individual homevoters. The legislative
273. Mar. 25 Hearing on S.B. 268, supra note 213, at 8 (statement of Susan Haas).
274. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget,”
62 CASE W. L. REV. 81, 89–96 (2011).
275. Id.
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process is less accessible to homevoters but more accessible to
professional lobbyists. Average homevoters are unlikely to challenge
a general state intervention because, until the issue is a specific
proposed development on their block, the issue is not salient.
Conversely, child care advocates, family day care provider networks,
and advocates for working families are experienced repeat players at
the state capitol. They cannot, however, appear before every local
board on behalf of every local provider. The state capitol provides an
opportunity for input that they do not have at the local level. Those
seeking to engage in land uses opposed by homevoters will have a
voice in state capitols, even if they are poorly suited to advocate at
the local level.
In short, states provide a forum less likely to be used by angry
neighbors. In opposition to Michigan’s intervention, one state
legislator argued that “[w]e’re assuming that local people, local
elected officials, don’t have the same concern for children and child
care as we have.”276 The issue, however, is not that local officials do
not care for children; it is that the structure of local government
prioritizes concentrated special interests’ property values over the
interests of children. State legislators, on the other hand, have the
flexibility to consider other issues and balance them against
homeowners’ fears regarding property values.
B.

State Bureaucracies Advance Local Deregulation

Once at the capitol, interest groups are able to make arguments
that are compelling to state legislators even though local zoning
commissions might have considered them irrelevant. First among
these is the argument that local policymaking undermines state
administrative functions.
Local choices often impose externalities outside of local borders.
Based on a straight analysis of externalities, one might assume that
states will intervene anytime their interests diverge from local
interests. If a development imposes negative externalities locally but
positive externalities at the state level, the state might eliminate local
approvals processes. If a development imposes positive externalities
locally but negative externalities at the state level, the state might
impose a requirement that the development procure both state and
local approvals. Where state and local incentives align, much of the

276. 2 S. JOURNAL, 1988 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2854 (Mich. 1988).
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existing scholarship assumes that local control of land use ought to be
the default rule.
This analysis does not account, however, for salience. The simple
existence of externalities does not ensure that the state will step in to
address them. States will consider intervention only when the parties
affected by the externality can organize themselves to advocate for
intervention. The problem of large lot and other exclusionary zoning,
which imposes positive externalities locally but negative externalities
statewide and nationwide, evidences the importance of salience and
organization. Very few states intervene in exclusionary zoning of
multifamily and other forms of denser housing. The externalities are
diffuse and their impact on any one person is small. In contrast,
perceived positive externalities at the local level are highly salient.
In the case of family day care homes, alternative energy
infrastructure, and group homes, however, the otherwise diffuse
negative externalities are felt by a state agency, thus solving for
salience and organization. Local zoning limited the ability to pursue
bureaucratic functions such as licensing family day cares,
deinstitutionalization, and meeting renewable energy goals. State
governmental agencies, whether directly or indirectly, felt the impact
of local regulations. And the local regulatory process did not account
for that impact. Responding to risk-averse homevoters, local
governments rely on outright prohibition rather than simply
regulating discrete negative externalities.
In the case of alternative energy, family day care, and group
homes, the fact that a state bureaucracy—not just individual solar
power users, day care providers, and disabled individuals—is
subjected to negative externalities of local land use regulation
corrects for the problem of salience. Displacing interventions follow
because the state bureaucracy has an interest in correcting local
instincts to prohibit LULUs rather than simply regulate minor local
negative externalities.
These examples suggest that state government has a powerful
role to play in what is essentially a libertarian project: stripping local
authorities of the power to zone and refusing to replace it with federal
or state zoning power. These are “big government” arguments for
smaller government. If, however, one appropriate role for
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government is ensuring that markets operate efficiently,277 it should
not at all be surprising that states have a deregulatory role to play in
reining in overzealous local zoning authorities. While state
regulations apply to family day care homes, manufactured housing,
alternative energy infrastructure, and group homes, the interventions
are nevertheless deregulatory because they eliminate land use
regulations entirely (even while health, safety, consumer protection,
and other regulations might be imposed by the state).
State interventions are, in turn, often informed by federal
priorities. Group home interventions, for example, followed the
availability of federal funding for community-based care. Similarly,
federal incentives to license family day cares led to more licensing
statutes which, in turn, led to zoning interventions. In situations in
which the federal government has an interest in local zoning—clean
air, affordable housing, fair housing, climate change prevention and
mitigation—federal bureaucrats may have a role to play, even where
Congress is unwilling to intervene directly in local authority to zone.
C.

Tailoring Requirements Replace Local Vetoes with Standards

It is not surprising that states are more likely to displace local
regulation where another regulatory rubric is available. Whether the
standard is state licensing requirements for group homes and family
day cares or the federal HUD Code for manufactured housing, it does
not matter that the standard does not itself preempt local zoning
authority. Instead, the standard assures state lawmakers that the land
use in question will not go entirely unregulated even after local
governments’ authority to regulate them is restricted.
What is more interesting and informative is that states sometimes
adopt new standards where they did not exist before. The Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act imposes very little in the way of standards
for local zoning decisions. But in the case of these displacing
interventions, states routinely craft standards and rules to confine
local action. The displacing intervention allows local governments to
regulate some aspects of LULUs, but not exclude them entirely. As
one family child care advocate described these battles, “[w]hile
zoning has always been a peculiarly local function, . . . there was . . .
no justification for absolute prohibition of homes in any community,
277. See generally Reeve T. Bull, Market Corrective Rulemaking: Drawing on EU
Insights to Rationalize U.S. Regulation, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 679–80 (2015) (discussing
the role agencies play in addressing a market failure).
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regardless of local conditions.”278 In short, state legislators address
some local objections by allowing local governments to regulate
specific enumerated aspects of a local development. They refuse,
however, to allow local governments to overregulate and enact
blanket prohibitions.
These standards and rules are crafted to address only those local
concerns that state lawmakers find compelling. Because displacing
interventions are passed without regard to any one specific
development, proponents of local control must identify categories of
local concerns that might be relevant to future development
proposals. Where the state concludes that overconcentration is a
legitimate concern, the standard might be a group home or family day
care quota effectuated through dispersal. Where the legitimate
concern is aesthetics, the state might permit localities to require roofs
of manufactured homes to match the pitch of roofs on neighboring
houses. Where the legitimate concern is safety, the state might allow
localities to require family day care providers to erect fencing.
In all of these cases, whether family day cares in Michigan,
manufactured housing in Nevada, or alternative energy infrastructure
in California, the state restricts both the means and the ends of local
regulations. Only limited interests are recognized. And regulations
must be crafted to protect those interests. Tailoring requirements are
rare in zoning enabling acts. It is a welcome surprise to find them
here, where the state recognizes both its interest in encouraging
certain land uses and the local interest in mitigating their impact on
their immediate surroundings.
These interventions demonstrate the role that states and the
federal government can play in what is, essentially, a libertarian
project. States and the federal government can intervene to
deregulate certain land uses for the benefit of people and industries
often sidelined by local governance structures. And they can do so in
a way that improves upon the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act by
considering the local interest in regulating discrete aspects of certain
land uses alongside the broader interest in permitting those uses to
exist. When they do occur, displacing interventions often successfully
balance state and local interests. They remove local authority to
prohibit certain land uses but expressly permit local governments to
address discrete enumerated potential negative impacts of those land
278. CAROL STEVENSON ET AL., CHILD CARE LAW CTR., FAMILY DAY CARE
ZONING ADVOCACY GUIDE 29 (1989).
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uses. This kind of tailoring requirement, which both addresses local
government’s propensity to overregulate land use and recognizes
local competency to address discrete aspects of development, ought
to serve as a model for state zoning enabling acts more broadly.
Tailoring requirements refuse to consider land use authority as a
binary, that the power to zone must reside either with localities or
with the state. Instead, they acknowledge local competency to
mitigate certain negative impacts of development while also
acknowledging state competency to balance the interests of
homevoters against those of other relevant lobbying groups.
IV. EMBRACING TAILORING REQUIREMENTS
Bureaucratic agencies are, of course, regulators. But, as this
Article demonstrates, they are sometimes also the subject of
regulation. In the case studies examined above, state agencies bearing
the brunt of local regulations led the charge to dismantle those
regulations. Had it not been for those state agencies, various
powerless constituencies—disabled individuals, family day care
providers, clotheslines users, and families seeking low-cost child
care—would have remained subject to overzealous land use
regulations despite the cost that those regulations imposed on society
at large. Can we then look to the states to solve perhaps the most
pernicious overregulation problem in the country: local zoning that
dramatically inflates both housing consumption and housing cost?
Perhaps. Affordable housing politics are fraught, to say the least.
To a degree that the economists, political scientists, lawyers, and
psychologists have not yet completely explained, the development of
low-cost housing poses an existential threat to voters across the
political spectrum. Surely, racism,279 the Internal Revenue Code,280
and risk aversion281 all play a role and no one of these problems will
be solved overnight. I would, however, propose one possible solution
to the problem of the power of the homeowner lobby, advocating for
local control to the exclusion of all other priorities, with the full
understanding that local control means homeowner control.

279. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) (discussing the
connection between racism and affordable housing).
280. EDWARD L. GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO, RETHINKING FEDERAL HOUSING
POLICY: HOW TO MAKE HOUSING PLENTIFUL AND AFFORDABLE 88–119 (2008).
281. FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 3, at 8–10.
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Every state has a bureaucracy dedicated to affordable housing.
One might wonder why state housing agencies have not played this
role to advance state interventions to permit affordable and
multifamily housing development. One answer lies in the distinction
between subsidized and low-cost housing.282 State housing agencies
are charged with the former. They administer federal and state
housing subsidies. Typically, that is their only charge. They are not
held to account for the high cost of market housing by function of
either federal or state law. The analysis undertaken by this Article
suggests that holding state housing agencies accountable for the high
cost of market rate housing would force them to take action here. In
other words, expanding the authority of a state agency might result,
counterintuitively, in less government regulation by inducing the
agency to correct for local regulatory overreach.
Where state bureaucrats feel the brunt of onerous local
regulations, they recognize the need to limit local authority to impose
those regulations. Tailoring requirements enable state governments
to respect local ability to identify and correct discrete unpleasant
impacts of land development while stripping local governments of the
power to overreach by prohibiting entire categories of land uses
altogether. Counterintuitively, liberalizing local land use regulations
may require empowering state bureaucracies so as to acknowledge
the role that the states must play in a deregulatory project.

282. In the classroom, I routinely distinguish between “capital ‘A’ Affordable
Housing” (subsidized housing) and “lower case ‘a’ affordable housing” (low-cost
unsubsidized housing). The term is not uncontroversial, but increasingly, the literature
refers to “naturally occurring affordable housing.” See, e.g., Joe Cortright, The Myth of
Naturally Occurring Affordable Housing, CITYCOMMENTARY (Oct. 10, 2017),
http://cityobservatory.org/the-myth-of-naturally-occurring-affordable-housing/ [https://perma.cc/
EE62-FGU6]; H. Blair Kincer & Michael Novogradac, Filtered, As Opposed to Naturally
Occurring, Affordable Housing, NOVOGRADAC & COMPANY (Dec. 19, 2017),
https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/filtered-opposed-naturally-occurringaffordable-housing [https://perma.cc/B2VW-Q7ES].
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